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SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES 
(STECF) 
 
Landing Obligation in EU Fisheries part II (STECF-14-01) 
THIS REPORT WAS REVIEWED BY THE STECF BY WRITTEN PROCEDURE IN 
FEBRUARY 2014 
 
 
 
Background 
 
The introduction of the obligation to land all catches in the recent reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) (EU regulation 1380/2013) represents a fundamental shift in the 
management approach to EU fisheries. The new CFP introduces a switch from the monitoring 
landings as a measure of TAC/quota uptake to the monitoring and regulation of catches as an 
essential component of the landings obligation and also introduces regionalised decision-
making into the management of EU fisheries.  
The landings obligation included under Article 15 of the new CFP basic regulation prohibits 
the discarding of species subject to catch limits (i.e. TAC and quota species) and those 
subject to minimum size limits in the Mediterranean. It contains a number of exemptions are 
included, namely species not covered by catch limits; species where high survivability can be 
demonstrated and; limited volumes of permissible discards which can be triggered under 
certain conditions, the so called de minimis exemptions, as well as inter-species and inter-
annual quota flexibility mechanisms. 
Following joint STECF/ICES discussions on the landing obligation, a number of scientific 
and technical issues were identified as having significant implications for management 
implementation of the landing obligation requiring further analysis. STECF noted that these 
raised important considerations for the implementation of the regulation, catch forecasting, 
stock assessment and control and monitoring.  The expert group (EWG 13-16) was set up 
specifically to explore these issues with the intention to provide advice and guidance for the 
Commission, Member States and the industry to assist in the implementation of the landing 
obligation.  
During the meeting of this EWG 13-16 issues relating to survivability, de minis and quota 
flexibilities, data issues, control and enforcement issues and the formation of regional discard 
plans were addressed. However, it was agreed by EWG 13-16 that a further meeting was 
required to explore implementation issues surrounding the landing obligation. Given that the 
landings obligation will come into effect in 2015 for Baltic Fisheries for Salmon as well as 
fisheries targeting small and large pelagic species and industrial species, there is an urgent 
need to develop implementation guidelines for the Commission and Member States to 
facilitate the development of regional discard plans. 
 
 
Request to the STECF 
STECF is requested to review and comment on the findings presented in the Report of the 
EWG 13-17 in relation to the following Terms of Reference. 
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1. Develop guidelines to assist Member States in formulating joint recommendations that 
will form the basis of regional discard plans. These should articulate the information and 
minimum acceptable standards for the elements of the discard plans 
a. Definition of fisheries; management units and timelines for implementation.  
b. Exemptions on the basis of high survivability; 
c. Provisions for de minimis exemptions 
d. Provisions on documentation of catches;  
e. Fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes 
f. Identification of potential indicators for future impact assessments 
2. Through worked examples test and refine the revenue to break even revenue ratio 
economic balance indicator’, developed by EWG 13-16 to assess the de minimis 
conditionality of technical difficulties to improving selectivity 
3. Develop guidelines for setting appropriate minimum conservation reference sizes and 
explore cases where they could justification for changing them compared to the current 
minimum landing sizes.  
4. Through worked examples, identify circumstances leading to restrictions in fishing 
activity associated with restrictive quotas (choke species) and identify potential responses 
and options to minimise such situations.  
 
Observations of the STECF 
 
The Report of the STECF EWG 13-17 represents the findings of the second Expert Group meeting in 
a series of such meetings planned to address the implications associated with the implementation of 
the Landing Obligation, the provisions of which are prescribed primarily in Article 15 of the 2013 
Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 December 2013).  
 
The report provides further commentary on those issues listed in the Report of the EWG 13-16 
(STECF 13-23) that were identified as requiring further investigation and clarification, notably the 
following: 
• Definition of fisheries; management units and timelines for implementation.  
• Exemptions on the basis of high survivability 
• Provisions for de minimis exemptions 
• Provisions on documentation of catches 
• Fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes 
• Identification of potential indicators for future impact assessments 
• Analysis of potential chokes issues  
• In addition the EWG 13-17 Report presents a more detailed discussion on candidate 
guidelines for the development of discard plans.  
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Conclusions of the STECF  
The STECF concludes that the Report of the EWG 13-17 represents yet another important 
contribution to the identification and understanding of many of the key considerations that regional 
groups need to address when developing and assessing regional discard and management plans.   
STECF also concludes that the EWG 13-17 adequately addressed the Terms of Reference, but notes 
that all potential issues have not yet been fully addressed and further exploration of some issues is still 
required. These include inter alia, further analysis of technical issues relating to the provisions on 
survivability and de minimis exemptions contained in Article 15 of the 2013 Reform of the CFP. 
There is a particular need to explore such issues in relation to the discard plans that are currently 
being developed for the Baltic Sea and for pelagic species, both of which are required to be in place 
by 1 January 2015. To this end, a third Expert Group meeting (EWG 14-01) is to be convened in 
Varese, Italy from 10-14 February 2014 with the following Terms of Reference:  
1. Evaluate the various elements of the Baltfish draft joint recommendations. Identify areas 
where additional supporting information may be required.  
2. Review the current scientific knowledge on the survival of salmon and identified small 
pelagic species and where appropriate, provide guidance on additional scientific information 
that may be required in support of applications for species specific exemptions based on high 
survival.  
3. Develop an objective framework for setting de minimis levels taking account of the provisions 
of article 2 of the basic regulation (e.g. FMSY and Precautionary Approach considerations)  
 
4. Review the control and monitoring issues associated with the documentation of catches to be 
specified in discard plans.  
 
5. Test this framework using worked examples form Pelagic fisheries and the Baltic Sea.  
 
STECF endorses the findings presented in the report of the EWG 13-17. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Definition of fisheries; management units and timelines for implementation.  
The Common Fisheries Policy regulation (EU regulation 1380/2013) provides different and 
phased timelines for the implementation of the landings obligation. In some cases, the time 
line is defined on the basis of the “fishery” with some species attached to them, in other 
cases, time line is defined on the basis of a list of species with some fisheries attached to 
them. This could allow for a landings obligation to apply to only e.g. cod caught in the 
directed fisheries for cod, haddock, whiting and saithe and not apply to cod caught in other 
fisheries e.g. for Norway lobster. Staggering the introduction of species depending on which 
management (fishery) unit may have some unintended consequences, for example from a 
control and catch documentation perspective if specific stocks are included or excluded 
depending on the fishery. An alternative interpretation could mean that only specific species 
are phased in over time, and that all fisheries irrespective of their overall contribution they 
make to catches of that species are subject to the landings obligation. Managers may want to 
consider that this may be more tractable from a control and monitoring perspective and would 
avoid the need to define management units based on specific catch profile. 
Exemptions on the basis of high survivability 
EWG 13-16 identified the type and utility of experiments that could be used to assess 
survival in the short, medium and longer-term. EWG 13-17 has identified the types of data 
that should be collated to support applications for exemption based on the notion of high 
survivability. EWG 13-17 reiterates that it is not possible to provide any judgement on what 
constitutes ‘high’ as this is a subjective term and is dependent on the survival rate at age and 
the age composition of the overall catch and the relative contribution discards make to it and 
whether exempting fisheries will remove the incentive to reduce discards which is considered 
the primary objective of article 15. Exemptions are likely to be metier specific which has 
implications in terms of the level of supporting information required in that exemptions 
should not only focus on the biological survivability of the species, but how the evidence of 
survival relates to the fishing activity and in turn how these metiers are defined in the 
regional plans. The data and information needed to provide reasonable scientific evidence of 
high survival in most cases will be substantive. The work presented in this report represents 
the initial considerations of EWG 13-17 but further work to develop more detailed guidelines 
is being undertaken by an ICES expert group (Workshop on Methods for Estimating Discard 
Survival (WKMEDS)). 
Provisions for de minimis exemptions 
The EWG 13-17 maintained the view that the spirit and general purpose of the de minimis 
provision (‘a small discard proportion’) is to provide a ‘safety valve’ allowing for some 
discarding in the most difficult circumstances. The application of de minimis should be 
considered only after other technical or tactical approaches to avoid capture of unwanted 
catch in the first instance have been exhausted (Recitals 29 & 31 EU regulation 1380/2013). 
As such, a large number of de miminis cases would not be expected to be found in 
forthcoming discard plans and, as with exemptions for survival, EWG 13-17 considers that a  
thorough review all the available options for reducing discards ahead of developing cases for 
justifying the conditionalities of the de minimis would be beneficial and it is suggested that a 
hierarchical or decision tree approach could be developed to identify inter alia – cases where 
there was  an obvious or ‘easy’ solution, cases where changes in the quota management 
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approach would be beneficial, opportunities for quota exchange or the use of flexibilities, 
spatial avoidance measures or adoption of new more selective gears. EWG 13-16 concluded 
that on a purely technical basis, there is scope for improvements in selectivity (or fish 
avoidance using other methods eg spatial). The difficulty for most fishing operations is that 
such improvements may lead to losses in revenue or increases in cost, rendering the 
improvements ’difficult to achieve’. Several examples of situations where technical solutions 
potentially lead to reduced economic viability were tabulated in the previous report. An 
approach making use of the ‘break even indicator’ was proposed as a tool for evaluating 
potential de minimis cases and testing the first conditionality (EWG 13-16). This concept was 
explored further by EWG 13-17 through a worked example to show how the tool could be 
used by the regional groups. The analysis shows that the greater the increase in selectivity, 
the greater the decrease in revenue, and a resultant lower CR/BER estimate. It is worth noting 
however, that there are a number of other external factors that can affect the CR/BER such as 
fluctuations in fuel and quota leasing costs which may mean that in any given year the 
business may be generating more than enough revenue to break even (>1), and less so in 
others (<1). No consideration has been given to any potential increases in income that could 
be expected with quota uplift, and therefore could be viewed as a worst case scenario. The 
analysis is based on the use of average information and does not provide any indication of the 
scale of variability within a given fleet segment meaning that even if the average CR/BER 
estimate is positive, the fleet segment may contain individual businesses that have CR/BER 
ratios of less than 1. Notwithstanding, the potential of the CR/BER approach is to identify 
selectivity options which would result in taking a fleet from a position of being nearly always 
profitable position into a permanently loss making one. 
Regarding the triggering of de minimis on the basis of “disproportionate costs” EWG 13-17 
assumed that disproportionate cost is assumed and the issue is to arrive at some discard 
percentage which will be permitted for a particular gear in a specific fishery. The process of 
arriving at an acceptable discard percentage for different gears under an assumption of 
disproportionate cost is complex and depends on the specificities of each fishery. EWG 13-17 
considered that defining specific values would be unhelpful. Instead, guidelines on the types 
of information to be considered and submitted in a regional discard plan were compiled.  
EWG 13-17 suggests that the following information should be presented in the regional 
discard plans. This should include: the management unit in terms of number of vessels; the 
target Species and unwanted by-catch species; the cause of disproportionate costs; the 
measures taken to reduce disproportionate costs; total annual catches by species for the 
management units; the total levels of unwanted catches; discard rate and the contribution to 
the total unwanted catches for all management units. Of primary importance is specifying the 
actual level of de minimis to be applied, which will need to be specified in the plan. 
Provisions on documentation of catches 
EWG 13-17 consider that regional groups need to consider this introduction of appropriate 
methods for on-board catch documentation and reiterates that the evidence thus far indicates 
that the current mandatory recording of discards in logbooks is unreliable and represents a 
gross underestimate of actual discards. This implies that consideration should be given to the 
introduction of additional methods for catch verification. EWG 13-17 notes that EU 
regulation 1380/2013 that “Member states shall ensure detailed and accurate documentation 
of all fishing trips and adequate capacity and means, such as observers, closed circuit 
television (CCTV) and others.”  Enhanced measures (such as those identified in 1380/2013) 
may be necessary on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the level of risk posed by a 
given fishery or fleet. Where fleets from more than one MS share a common fishery, regional 
groups should consider the potential for a harmonised approach to monitoring requirements. 
 11 
Consideration might usefully be given to altering the applicability of the current 50 kg 
threshold per species to < 50 kg per trip and assessing the potential unaccounted catch 
associated with different threshold levels. Regional groups should consider whether there is a 
requirement to reduce the threshold (vessel length) at which reporting in logbooks becomes 
mandatory or alternatively ensure that fisheries monitoring (observer) programs can capture 
this information independently through inter alia observers or electronic monitoring. 
Regional groups will need to establish a suitable means of monitoring the level of de minimis 
discarding where this applies to a given fishery. The degree of monitoring required should be 
assessed against the potential risks of the de minimis allowance being exceeded or where this 
flexibility may be open to abuse. EWG 13-17 considers that it would be preferable that the 
justification of the selection of the enforcement tools to support the provision of fully 
documented catches should be clearly indicated in the regional plans. Regarding high risk 
fisheries full monitoring (CCTV and/or observers) are the only control methods which seem 
to be effective to ensure all catches are documented and counted against quota.  
Fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes 
In line with the obligation to land all catches, there is a need to abolish current minimum 
landing sizes (MLS) and replace them by Minimum Conservation Reference Sizes (MCRS). 
While the basis of MCRS appear to be similar to the present MLS “established with the aim 
of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms” the obligation to land (and 
discount against quota) all fish below MCRS, if appropriately implemented, does introduce a 
strong economic incentive to avoid capture of fish below MCRS as those catches will 
consume available quota and/or will create difficulties of storage. However, application of 
MCRS across a broad range of species in complex mixed-species fisheries may result in 
substantial uptake in catches below MCRS if not appropriately aligned with the selectivity 
characteristic of the main gears. EWG 13-17 has identified guidelines to assist in the setting 
of MCRS, EWG 13-17 considers that plans should clearly state the objectives for setting 
MCRS and that the primary objective should be for the protection of juveniles. Plans should 
also specify the metrics to be used to measure protection of juveniles, for example through 
the reduction in fishing mortality on juveniles to a specified rate.  If there is no provision to 
include a MCRS in the plan for stocks for which a MLS currently exists or conversely where 
no MLS exists and there is a desire to introduce a MCRS, provision of supporting 
information to justify the absence of a MCRS would inform the decision on whether to accept 
such a provision. Plans should provide information to demonstrate that the introduction of the 
proposed MCRS is likely to achieve the stated objectives. Such information, where possible, 
should include results of simulations.  EWG 13-17 notes that there are a variety of issues that 
regional groups may wish to take into account when considering the desirability of 
introducing a MCRS, these include the setting of MCRS for market considerations, limiting 
the supply of particular size ranges to prevent oversupply; social or ethical reasons e.g. 
minimising catches that cannot be sold for human consumption; biological and ecological 
considerations e.g. to encourage a change in exploitation pattern for example to realise the 
growth potential of the stock and/or to reduce the fishing mortality on juveniles. 
Identification of potential indicators for future impact assessments 
There was insufficient time available to fully consider potential indicators for future 
evaluations of the landing obligation and to assess the performance of individual regional 
discard plans. However, EWG 13-17 consider this is an important aspect that should be 
considered within regional discard plans and work should progress on this aspect and this 
might be best achieved through a dedicated expert group or contract.  
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Analysis of potential chokes issues  
The available studies of the potential impacts of choke species suggest that there is a risk of 
choke species having a large negative effect on fishing if access to quota issues cannot be 
resolved.  In many cases there may be businesses unable to continue trading and large 
quantities of quota uncaught if choke species take the effect highlighted in these reports.  In 
some cases, substantial changes in practice will be required in order for businesses to remain 
profitable while observing the landings obligations. All methods used in the analyses 
considered relied on very important assumptions which may not represent the reality, and, 
depending on the assumptions used, may lead to very different conclusions. However, 
without a large margin of flexibility there could possibly be a substantial and unsustainable 
loss in profitability for vessel businesses.  The interpretation of the regulation, particularly the 
application of de minimis allocations, may have substantial effects on businesses as a 
consequence, the prospect of going out of business would clearly generate a substantial 
incentive for individual business operators not to comply with the landings obligation and 
compliance issues should be considered in light of identified expected choke species.  
Objective 1 of the CFP requires that fishing should deliver economic and social benefits and 
be done in such a way as to be environmentally sustainable.  Article 15 of CFP reform might 
prove inconsistent with this objective if many vessel businesses cannot continue to trade and 
much of the agreed quota remains uncaught due to the effects of choke species. Quota swaps 
between MS might become more difficult to achieve because MS that previously were 
willing to swap away quota, may now need that quota to prevent the species from becoming a 
choke species. The problem and solutions vary by MS according to how they variously 
manage their allocation of quotas to vessels / businesses.  MS and Producer Organisations 
that operate tradable quota units will have different solutions than those that have equal 
monthly catch allocations per vessel, non-tradable and not time flexible.  Different species 
may choke different individual vessels and / or groups of vessels operating in the same sea 
areas, depending on how access to quota is allocated.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The basic regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy allows for cooperation between 
Member States on conservation measures at a regional basis (article 18), the so called 
regionalisation of the CFP. It is envisaged that the landings obligation, a central tenant of the 
CFP reform, should be included as part of more encompassing multi-annual (multi-
species/mixed-fisheries) plans (articles 9 and 10). However, institutional issues with co-
decision between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, has slowed the 
delivery of these. In order to facilitate the introduction of the landings obligation in 
accordance with the timelines specified in article 15.1, alternative provisions are available for 
the development and implementation of time-limited (3 years) ‘stand-alone’ discard plan 
until such time that the landings obligation can be incorporated into multi-annual 
management plans (article 15.6). 
Article 15.5 allows for Member States, in consultation with the Advisory Councils, to submit 
joint recommendations (discard plans) for the implementation of the landings obligation to 
the European Commission describing specific provisions, aligned with the specifications of 
article 15.5 (a)-(e). These should articulate the specific details on how the plans are to be 
implemented, including details on the fleets and species covered, proposals for exemptions 
based on high survival; provisions for de minimis exemptions; provisions for the 
documentation of catches and the fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes.   
Member States have an obligation to ensure that any joint recommendations are based on the 
best available scientific evidence and that they fulfil a number of requirements and that the 
recommendations are compatible with the objectives and quantifiable targets specified in 
Article 2 of the basic regulation (Article 18.5(a)). If the provisions are not deemed to be in 
accordance with these, then the Commission may submit alternative plans (Article 15.7).  
The role of STECF in this process is to provide support, when requested, to the Commission 
on the application of the basic regulation (article 6.2). To this end, STECF has been requested 
to provide comment on a number of issues relating to the implementation, catch forecasting, 
stock assessment and control and monitoring. In particular, EWG 13-16 commented on issues 
surrounding exemptions, flexibilities and catch documentation elements of the provisions of 
the landings obligation. The conclusions of EWG 13-16 highlighted that there are a plausible 
range of interpretations associated with some of the provisions and depending on 
interpretation, which depending on how they are implemented, could result in unintended or 
unwanted circumstances.  
Given the timelines for the introduction of the landing obligation (article 15.1) and the 
regionalisation provisions, a number of initiatives to develop regional discard plans are 
already underway within and between Member States and also by Advisory Councils. The 
specificities of these are known to vary in terms of detail and content and this is simply 
reflective of the state of progress, as well as the need and desire to develop discard plans in 
the absence of specific guidance on the specific details that may be required for subsequent 
evaluation. To this end, EWG 13-17 was convened by the Commission to draft a series of 
guidance notes that could be used by those responsible with the drafting of discard plans.   
These guidelines articulate the types of data and information that may be required in order to 
assess the appropriateness of the plan and whether the plan is in accordance with the general 
provisions of the basic regulation. It is stressed that the contents of these guidelines are based 
on expert scientific opinion from the first meeting convened to consider the data and 
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information needs. As such, these guidelines should only be considered as a first step in an 
evolving process and will undoubtedly be modified and refined as the process of developing 
discard plans evolves. By necessity, the guidance notes are generic and may not be fully 
applicable to every situation. It should be noted that it is not the intention of this document to 
identify the specific details of discard plans in a prescriptive sense; these details are the 
responsibility of those making the joint recommendation. However, this document may be 
useful as guidance to the standards and level of detail that may be required for future 
evaluation of discard plans by the the European Commission for approval and 
implementation through delegated acts.    
2 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EWG-13-17 
 
Background 
The introduction of the obligation to land all catches in the recent reform of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) (EU regulation 1380/2013) represents a fundamental shift in the 
management approach to EU fisheries. The new CFP introduces a switch  from the 
monitoring landings as a measure of TAC/quota uptake to the monitoring and regulation of 
catches as an essential component of the landings obligation and also introduces regionalised 
decision-making into the management of EU fisheries.  
The landings obligation included under Article 15 of the new CFP basic regulation prohibits 
the discarding of species subject to catch limits (i.e. TAC and quota species) and those 
subject to minimum size limits in the Mediterranean. It contains a number of exemptions are 
included, namely species not covered by catch limits; species where high survivability can be 
demonstrated and; limited volumes of permissible discards which can be triggered under 
certain conditions, the so called de minimis exemptions, as well as inter-species and inter-
annual quota flexibility mechanisms. 
Following joint STECF/ICES discussions on the landing obligation, a number of scientific 
and technical issues were identified as having significant implications for management 
implementation of the landing obligation requiring further analysis. STECF noted that these 
raised important considerations for the implementation of the regulation, catch forecasting, 
stock assessment and control and monitoring.  The expert group (EWG 13-16) was set up 
specifically to explore these issues with the intention to provide advice and guidance for the 
Commission, Member States and the industry to assist in the implementation of the landing 
obligation.  
During the meeting of this EWG 13-16 issues relating to survivability, de minis and quota 
flexibilities, data issues, control and enforcement issues and the formation of regional discard 
plans were addressed. However, it was agreed by EWG 13-16 that a further meeting was 
required to explore implementation issues surrounding the landing obligation. Given that the 
landings obligation will come into effect in 2015 for Baltic Fisheries for Salmon as well as 
fisheries targeting small and large pelagic species and industrial species, there is an urgent 
need to develop implementation guidelines for the Commission and Member States to 
facilitate the development of regional discard plans. 
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Specific Terms of Reference 
 
5. Develop guidelines to assist Member States in formulating joint recommendations that 
will form the basis of regional discard plans. These should articulate the information and 
minimum acceptable standards for the elements of the discard plans 
 
a. Definition of fisheries; management units and timelines for implementation.  
b. Exemptions on the basis of high survivability; 
c. Provisions for de minimis exemptions 
d. Provisions on documentation of catches;  
e. Fixing of minimum conservation reference sizes 
f. Identification of potential indicators for future impact assessments 
 
6. Through worked examples test and refine the revenue to break even revenue ratio 
economic balance indicator’, developed by EWG 13-16 to assess the de minimis 
conditionality of technical difficulties to improving selectivity 
 
7. Develop guidelines for setting appropriate minimum conservation reference sizes and 
explore cases where they could justification for changing them compared to the current 
minimum landing sizes.  
 
8. Through worked examples, identify circumstances leading to restrictions in fishing 
activity associated with restrictive quotas (choke species) and identify potential responses 
and options to minimise such situations.  
3 TOR 1A - DEFINITION OF FISHERIES; MANAGEMENT UNITS AND TIMELINES FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Article 15(5a) of Regulation (EU) 1380/2014 defines the first element that can be included 
under a regional discard plan as, "specific provisions regarding fisheries or species concerned 
by the landing obligation". EWG 13-17 takes this to mean the definition of fisheries and 
timelines for implementation within a discard plan following clarification by the 
Commission. 
Definition of Fisheries 
The approach taken in discard or multiannual plan requires the definition of management 
units to differentiate fisheries/fleets/metiers. In this regard Regulation (EU) 1389/2014 uses 
the generic term “fisheries” as the management unit in the context of formulating discard 
plans throughout Article 15 without defining what is actually meant by "fisheries". In seeking 
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to prepare discard plans for regions, MS should consider what groups or combinations of 
vessels, species, areas, and gears they are including in separate plans. Where possible it can 
be helpful to avoid use of the word “fishery” and instead say more precisely what is meant, 
e.g. fleet segment or vessels, or activity by vessels fishing mainly for [species] in [area]. 
In para 15.1.a) four bullet points start with “fisheries for [list of species]”.  So in this case the 
word “fishery” seems to refer to the activity aimed at catching those fish species. The 
implication of interpreting it this way is it means that all species subject to catch limits that 
are caught by those fishing activities shall be recorded landed and counted against the quota 
where applicable (where there is a quota).  Therefore, if vessels engaged in catching small 
pelagic, large pelagic, industrial species and salmon in the Baltic, have unwanted catches of, 
for example, demersal species subject to catch limits, then those demersal fish shall also be 
subject to the landings obligation because they are caught by a pelagic “fishery”.  It seems 
clear that para 1.a) does not only refer to the species listed, but to all species caught by 
vessels fishing for the species listed. 
Para 15.1.b,c,d) have a different construct than para 15.1.a). They refer to species that define 
the fisheries at one date and then at a later date, all other species in the named sea areas.  
Noticeably, no species are explicitly listed for the Baltic Sea (1b) and for the 
Mediterranean/Black Sea (1d), whereas there are some species mentioned for the North Sea, 
Northwestern and Southwestern waters. However, this notion of a fishery “for” certain 
species implies that the operator of the vessel is intending to catch a certain species or group 
of species, and therefore the phrase “fishery for” implies knowing the intention of the vessel 
operator on any specific fishing trip or even any specific tow of the nets.  It is for example 
conceivable that in the North Sea, a vessel operator might intend to catch a mix of cod, 
haddock, whiting and saithe, but would also expect to catch some quantity of hake in the 
same tows of the nets.  How to define or record the intent of the vessel operator in terms of 
what species are intended to be caught in any individual trip or tow of the nets could be a 
challenge for those drafting discard plans.  Certainly if there is a discard plan for some 
selected species during the period 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018, it seems that it could 
be legal to discard any species that the vessel operator states was not the intended species to 
be caught, even if there is evidence from previous similar activities to show that those species 
will almost inevitably be caught. 
The date for pelagic species to be subject to the landings obligation is 1st January 2015. The 
discard plan for mackerel is for mackerel and not for any specific types of gear . However, a 
problem arises for the potential non-pelagic bycatches. Paragraph 1.a) can be interpreted to 
mean that any non-pelagic species bycatch that is subject to catch limit is also subject to the 
landing obligation, if the operators are expecting and intending to catch pelagic species and 
therefore the “fishery” (vessels, area, activity, intended catch) is classed as a “small pelagic 
fishery” or “large pelagic fishery”. Alternatively , the timeline of 1st January 2015, specified 
in para 1.a) could be taken to mean that only the pelagic species of catches by vessels whose 
operators are aiming for pelagic species and not the accidental bycatch, are subject to the 
landings obligation.  
This issue will for example be important for the mixed demersal/pelagic fisheries as practiced 
in the South western waters, which cannot easily be classified as either pelagic or demersal, 
therefore the implementation timeline is unclear. Also, some fisheries like Hake fisheries in 
North Western waters can have some by-catch of small pelagics and will therefore not enter 
the landing obligation until 1st January 2016 as the species defining the fisheries are 
predominantly demersal species like Hake, Monkfish or Megrim. 
 17 
For the fisheries other than pelagic and Baltic, Para 1 a) to d) give dates by which the 
landings obligation shall apply to fish caught in the sea areas and to the species or by the 
fisheries listed.  In para 1.c) there is a clear date, 1 January 2016, by which the landings 
obligation should apply to species which define the fisheries to be included.  However, the 
regulation gives a much later date, 1 January 2019, by which all other species, which are 
subject to catch limits, must be subject to the landings obligation and therefore also included 
in the appropriate Discard Plan(s).  Regional Discard Plans should explicitly state which 
species that are not listed but which are also caught in those sea areas are subject to catch 
limits.  Discard Plans should specify the date (no later than the specified date) by which 
landings obligations shall apply to those other (not listed) species. 
Several management units at the level of fishing vessels and fishing activities are commonly 
used in fisheries management. The Data Collection Framework (DCF) is based on the 
collection of scientific data on two types of management unit:  
− A fleet (or fleet segment) being a group of vessels with the same length class and 
predominant fishing gear during the year. Vessels may have different fishing activities 
during the reference period, but might be classified in only one fleet segment.  
− A métier being a group of fishing operations targeting a similar (assemblage of) 
species, using similar gear, during the same period of the year and/or within the same 
area and which are characterised by a similar exploitation pattern.  
As such, the fleet describes the vessels while the métier(s) describes the fishing activity in 
which the fleet engages (Figure 1). Both concepts are complementary in capturing the 
diversity and flexibility of fishing operations. 
 
Fleets and métiers are aggregations of individual operations and vessels and as such are not 
natural entities with obvious boundaries (like, e.g. a species). Each vessel (and each trip, 
respectively) is unique in terms of catch rate, fishing type, profitability, incentives, etc., it is 
very difficult to provide simple and meaningful averages and to identify key fishing patterns. 
Grouping and averaging depend upon the desired management scale and grouping criteria 
used. It has been shown that in many cases, the link between fishing trip inputs (e.g. gear, 
mesh size, area) and fishing trip outputs (catch composition) is unclear, especially in 
demersal mixed fisheries. This implies that a given fishing trip /fishing vessel might end up in 
very different categories if fisheries are defined by gear and mesh size or by target species. 
Additionally, classifications based on target species (“fisheries for Norway lobster”) suffer 
from several major hindrances: i) available data at the scale of the fishing trip reflect only 
what has been landed, and not what has been caught, the difference between both being 
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linked to selectivity, markets and regulation aspects; ii) catch data reflect the actual outcome 
of the trip, but this may differ from the intended target, iii) the classification of the trip into a 
target-based fishery can only be done a posteriori after the trip has taken place, which limits 
how such fisheries can be managed, iv) different species might be targeted in individual hauls 
within the same trip; and v) many trips will de facto catch a range of species in varying 
proportions, ending up in unclear boundaries between target fisheries (for example, is a trip 
with 40% Nephrops and 60% whitefish significantly different from a trip with 60% Nephrops 
and 40% whitefish?).  
In considering what management unit regional groups should use within a discard plan there 
are a number of factors that needed to be considered. 
If regional groups choose to follow a species based approach irrespective of which fisheries 
they are caught in, then there is little need to define management units (fleet segments or 
metiers). Following such an approach the only real main requirement for defining 
management units would be for implementing specific exemptions to the landing obligation 
(e.g. de minimis or high survivability exemptions).  
If, however, regional groups choose to phase implementation based on fisheries rather than 
species then it will be necessary to identify fleets or management units with homogenous 
catch patterns in much greater detail. However, in this case EWG 13-17 underlines that trade-
offs will need to be made between the precision and the number of management units that can 
be easily defined. EWG 13-17 suggests three levels with varying degrees of complexity:  
(i) stock (i.e. species*area) level,  
(ii)  stock*gear level 
(iii) stock*gear*targeted fishery level.  
In the first case, definitions and rules are few and simple, but they disregard the major 
differences in discards rates and technological challenges across groups of users.  
In the second case, considerations are given to differences in discarding rates across gears, 
and are also easy enough to enforce if gear categories are directly linked to information 
available in logbooks. However, in mixed fisheries as pertain in the North Sea, this may lead 
to a great number of plans to enforce and control (as a matter of illustration, in the ICES 
MIXFISH analyses, which include the main assessed demersal stocks in the North Sea, 
Skagerrak and English Channel, 43 fleets segments are defined over the various countries (9), 
main gear (5) and, sometimes, vessel size class (up to 3); These fleets engage in one to four 
different métiers (defined as mesh size*area, e.g. TR1 in North Sea and TR2 in Eastern 
Channel), resulting in 118 combinations of country*fleet*métier*area catching cod, haddock, 
whiting, saithe, plaice, sole, Nephrops and hake). That number would be reduced if the 
discard plans are regionally (sea basin) and not nationally defined but even so the number of 
potential management units is relatively large.  
In the third level where criteria other than gear/mesh size/(vessel size) are used to define a 
fishery/management unit (e.g. distinguishing between saithe targeted fishery vs. cod targeted 
fishery), great flexibility can be used for defining target action that is tailored to local 
circumstances. However, such an option would suffer from three major difficulties: the 
multiplicity of plans to manage and control; the difficulty to quantitatively and objectively 
define rules for identifying which activity belongs to which fishery; and the risk for regional 
unbalance in the level playing field. 
Based on this analysis EWG 13-17 suggests regional groups think carefully about the 
approach they take (i.e. species or fisheries based) and take cognisance of the implications of 
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the potential complexities before defining management units. EWG 13-17 considers the 
following should be identified: 
• Where and for which purpose specific management units are needed (e.g. survivability 
and/or de minimis exemptions)  
• If the units are linked to vessels (“fleet segments”), fishing activities (“métiers”) or both 
• If the units are specific to a subset of Member States or  apply across the whole 
region/area 
• If the units are linked to a given gear/mesh size throughout the year or if they are specific 
to given seasons and/or given areas and/or given types of fishing patterns within this 
gear/mesh size category 
• If there is sufficient data to specifically evaluate the basis for exemption of these units 
within the current data collection frames, and if not, whether specific monitoring will take 
place (e.g. through self-sampling or specific studies) 
• How a fishing vessel and/or fishing activity can be eligible for belonging to that Use of 
the word “fishery” (and “fisheries”) can sometimes lead to lack of clarity about its precise 
meaning as this word or concept is used variably by different people to include aspects of 
vessels, vessel types, gear, fishing activity, species or stock and location. Rules should be 
checked for applicability on available data  
 
3.1.1 Learning from the past: definitions issues in the first Effort Management Plans 2003-
2008 
In providing guidance for regional groups in defining the appropriate management units 
EWG 13-17 considers it useful to learn from previous attempts to define specific 
management units. 
Effort restrictions (days at sea) were first introduced in 2003 to supplement TACs in areas 
covered by the cod recovery plan (EC, 2004), and were updated annually afterwards. 
Subsequently, similar effort restrictions were introduced in relation to southern hake and 
Nephrops, western channel sole and sandeel fisheries. Management units (fisheries) for days 
at sea limits were defined in terms of gear type and codend mesh size combinations. ‘Special 
condition’ categories were also defined such that a vessel qualifying for such status would be 
entitled to a greater number of days at sea than the default value for the same gear-mesh size 
group. These categories were initially designed and implemented over a very short period of 
time and without any clear scientific basis. Subsequently, STECF expert groups were tasked 
to evaluate the effects of these regulations, requiring extensive compilation of effort and 
catch data aiming to match that hierarchy of gear, mesh size and special conditions. These 
exercises proved to be difficult, time-consuming, error-prone and inconsistent across EU 
Member States, mainly because the scientific data, collected following DCF standards, did 
not contain as precise gear descriptors as required by the effort regulation.  
Furthermore, the implementation of the days at sea system led to strong protests from the 
fishing industry questioning both its fairness and its basis. As cod is caught by most gears in 
the areas under the cod plans, most demersal fisheries were affected by the system, regardless 
of whether they were actually targeting cod or not. The industry considered this conservation 
measure to be neither efficient nor fairly shared, and protests pressured the Member States to 
exempt some of their fleets. This resulted in increasingly detailed micromanagement, and an 
even more complex set of regulations that basically changed every year (Table 1).  
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Table 3-1 Overview over the number of regulated gear categories (top value) and corresponding 
‘ special conditions’ (bottom value) by year in the EU Cod Management plan for the North Sea, 
Skagerrak and Eastern English Channel. Column in grey is the “new” cod plan 1342/2008. (From ICES, 
2009) 
 
Gear typ e 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Demersal Trawls, seines, towed 
gears  
3 
- 
3 
2 
3 
4 
5 
15 
5 
17 
5 
17 
3 
- 
Beam trawl  1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
2 
- 
Static demersal nets 1 
- 
1 
2 
1 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Gillnets   - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 
1 
4 
1 
4 
1 
1 
- 
Trammel - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- 
Long lines 1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
1 
- 
Total 6 10 13 35 39  39  8 
 
In 2008, the system was no longer considered sustainable, controllable and effective by the 
EU, and a complete new approach for effort control was agreed with Members States. This 
moved from limitations at the level of the individual vessel and métier to limitations at the 
level of the Member States over broader gear/mesh size categories, thus allowing for more 
flexibility. Additionally, some bottom-up mechanisms aiming at encouraging cod-avoidance 
behavior in the fishing industry (articles 11 and 13) were introduced alongside the existing 
top-down rigid effort categories by gear type. These exemptions mechanisms are not linked 
to a pre-agreed definition of gear, but are results-based mechanisms requiring that exempted 
fisheries demonstrate that the de facto catch low amount of cod. Four years later, it is 
noticeable that no proliferation of sub-categories has yet occurred, compared to the previous 
system.   
The conclusion is that as long as métiers are to be used for scientific and monitoring purposes 
without regulatory consequences, the issue of definition and quantification, although not easy 
to resolve due to the questions listed above, will stay within the scientific remit and will 
likely not lead to political disputes. On the other side, disputes on definitions issues are more 
likely to pop up when categorization start forming the basis of top-down regulations, where 
different subset of users are imposed different levels of restrictions. Obviously, the more 
mixed are the fisheries in question, the more difficult will it be to agree on management 
definitions. 
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Timelines  
Article 15 provides different and phased timelines for the implementation of the landing 
obligation which depend on the region, type of fisheries1 and species concerned. In some 
cases, the time line is defined on the basis of the fishery with some species attached to them 
(15.1a), in some other cases, the time line is defined on the basis of a list of species with 
some fisheries attached to them (15.1c). For the Baltic Sea (15.1b) and the Mediterranean and 
the Black Sea (15.1d), no species list is provided. Where specific fisheries are identified with 
an attached list of species, the implementation is relatively clear (and there are no phase-in 
provisions given in any case). Where phase-in provisions are given and these are as 
associated with a list of species with some fisheries attached, the interpretational issues are 
more substantial.  
Using the example of 15.1(c)(ii), which specifies the implementation for demersal fisheries in 
the North Sea, there are a number of possible scenarios that could be envisaged. 
 
 
One possible interpretation is that this could allow for a landing obligation to apply to only 
e.g. cod caught in the fisheries for cod, haddock, whiting and saithe and not apply to cod 
caught in fisheries for Nephrops for example. Staggering the introduction of species 
depending on which management (fishery) unit may have some unintended consequences, for 
example from a control and catch documentation perspective if specific stocks are included 
or excluded depending on the fishery.   
An alternative interpretation would mean that only specific species are phased in over time, 
and that all fisheries irrespective of their overall contribution they make to catches of that 
species are subject to the landings obligation. Managers may want to consider that this may 
be more tractable from a control and monitoring perspective and would avoid the need to 
define management units based on specific catch profile. Defining management units based 
on catch profiles will always present boundary issues between units, and can also offer an 
incentive to switch between management units to avoid short-term inclusion in the landings 
obligation. Furthermore, article 15.1(c) refers to “species which define the fisheries”, which 
is somewhat ambiguous. Articulating which species defines a fishery is a matter of 
perspective, which could be viewed from an economic, a biological or a gear standpoint. 
Furthermore, the significance of a particular species (in the context of defining a fishery) 
                                                 
1
 The term “fishery” is somewhat ambiguous and is a rather loose concept and may need to be more precisely 
defined in management plans (see section Error! Reference source not found. for further comment).  
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could be considered in terms of volumes caught or in terms of conservation status e.g. 
vulnerable species could be considered as defining a fishery if specific management actions 
are required for conservation purposes. 
3.1.2 De minimis and high survivability 
It is important to recognise the added complexity for defining management units introduced 
by the inclusion of de minimis and high survivability exemptions. These can be considered "a 
right to discard". This is a valuable right that vessel operators will want to secure because it 
can enable and legalise a certain amount of high-grading, which will increase their value per 
tonne landed. If a right to discard is created in a discard plan, then thought must be given to 
how that valuable right is allocated among individual businesses. If there are different rules 
or different enforcement regimes between different groups, then one will be deemed to be 
more attractive to business owners and the different sets of rules therefore create an incentive 
to be managed under the more attractive set of rules. So, for example  if operators of vessels 
under 10m don’t have to complete a log book and declare their landings, then owners of 
vessels just over 10m, will trade their vessel for one that is 9.99m long, in order to be able to 
operate under the more attractive set of rules.  This “threshold effect” has been observed and 
is predictable. 
The direct impact of differentiated discards plan by fishery is an important issue. A top-down 
imposed categorisation will lead to the same disputes and vicious circles as in the first cod 
plan. Therefore, regional groups should privilege a bottom-up approach where i) Member 
States would first suggest which specific fisheries they would like to consider, and how these 
can be evaluated and monitored on the basis of existing scientific data, and ii) a regional 
approach would address afterwards both a standardisation of definition of those national 
fisheries which are broadly common to several Member States, and, if needed a recognition 
of specific fisheries that are indeed practiced by specific Member States only. A similar 
approach has been for example followed by North Sea scientists in defining the fisheries used 
for bringing together national data into integrated datasets for the purposes of stock 
assessment and mixed fisheries advice.  
3.1.3 Phased inclusion of species  
For the various sets of fisheries and areas defined in articles 15.1.a-d, Member States could 
therefore 
• Identify the exhaustive list of species/stocks concerned, including also, beyond the target species 
already listed in the regulation (if any), 
• demersal bycatches in pelagic fisheries or pelagic bycatches in demersal fisheries (if relevant) 
• All TAC stocks 
• stocks subject to international agreements 
• Establish which of these have an early and established time line (first priority list) 
• Agree on the principle whether landings obligation for remaining species should be introduced 
gradually or all at once. 
• If a gradual introduction is preferred, establish a second priority (i.e. those not specifically listed 
in the regulation) list based on e.g. 
• jointly managed stocks 
 23 
• stocks with high levels of discards 
• stocks caught by a large variety of gears 
• stocks with poor biological status 
• stocks with low discards survivability  
• stocks managed in combined TAC and/or strongly associated to the target species 
• Establish an explicit time line for each individual species/stock in the list, no later than the 
latest time line expressed in the regulation. 
Examples of implementation strategies  
Skagerrak discards ban 
 
As a result of the revocation of the Skagerrak agreement and the joint ministerial declaration of 
23 November 2011 by the Ministers responsible for fisheries in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 
to introduce a discard ban in the Skagerrak, a joint EU-Norway working group consisting of 
managers, scientists and fishing organisations from Denmark, Sweden and Norway. 
The first main task of the Working Group was to propose a list of species to be included under 
a discard ban. It was therefore agreed that all three countries should compile and present their 
fishing activities in the Skagerrak.. The trans-boundary fisheries identified that was considered 
to be affected by the revocation of the Skagerrak agreement to be problematic due to their catch 
compositions in the anticipated discard ban was: Pandalus (Northern prawn) trawl fishery, 
Directed Nephrops trawl fishery, Mixed Nephrops and demersal trawl fishery; and, Mixed 
demersal trawl and seine fishery. Other fisheries where also identified (pelagic, industrial, gill- 
and trammel nets and creels and pots) but considered to be relatively unproblematic in terms of 
the anticipated discard ban. The identification and assignment of fisheries was rather 
unproblematic and did not cause any major problems for the parties. 
Using the catch information the Working Group developed a list of species that they proposed 
should be included under the discard ban. Initially, there were many discussions about whether 
the discard ban would be introduced on a fishery basis or by species. Norway insisted the 
discard ban should be species based. However, the group noted that for practical reasons a 
stepwise approach to the implementation of a discard ban may be necessary, where a set of 
criteria was developed to categorise the list of species in terms of implementing the discard ban. 
Criteria for species for which the discard ban would be introduced first was jointly managed 
stocks, species with high levels of discards, species caught across fisheries, species with poor 
survivability of discards and species with poor biological status. In a second step further species 
would be introduced. 
After this mapping exercise, the Working Group did not have any evidence that a species based 
discard ban would cause undue problems for any of the main fisheries in the Skagerrak. It was 
therefore recommended that a species approach rather than a fisheries approach was 
appropriate. However, exceptions for certain fisheries could be considered afterwards for 
specific fisheries in the light of experience gained during the first period of application or on 
the basis of scientific evidence on survival rates in those fisheries. 
 
Baltic  (BALTFISH) 
The draft discard plan for the Baltic Sea proposed by Baltfish, the regional body for the Baltic 
Sea countries, dismisses the timeline postulated in art 15.1b (2015 for species that define 
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fisheries and 2017 for all other species). This means that the landing obligation is introduced 
for all species at once January 1st 2015. By this construction the issue of definition of fisheries 
becomes irrelevant as all fisheries that catch species subject to catch limits are affected 
simultaneously (similar to the Skagerrak proposal). Furthermore, Baltfish suggest that de 
minimis provisions are to be seen as a last resort and suggests that de minimis is only relevant 
for seal damaged catch. 
 
Pelagic RAC approach 
STECF has examined the pelagic RAC proposals for possible future discard plans which are 
still in the process of developing. STECF notes that the discard plans been developed relate to 
the five species that come under their remit (Mackerel, Horse Mackerel, Blue whiting, herring 
and boarfish). These species will be incorporated in 12 separate discard plans with the aim to 
finalise these discard plans by July 2014. At this stage the Pelagic RAC is proposing to develop 
its plans in a specific format. STECF consider that this approach and format could also be 
potential starting point for other discard plans proposals. 
The pelagic RAC proposed approach involve 8 different sections. These are: 
Section 1 provides an introductory section dealing with biology, stock size and distribution, management 
and recent catch data. 
Section 2 is collating the existing fisheries data covering the different management area, different  gears, 
mesh size, vessel type & number and the fishing season, tonnage (by country). This data will be 
presented in tabular and GIS format. 
Section 3 is collating the existing discard data (ICES, STECF and other sources). This data will also be 
presented in a GIS format (discard atlases). This data should identify the key areas (hotspots) and gears 
where discarding is a main issue. It should be noted that this information will be a key component of the 
proposed plan.  
Section 4 identifies the discard measures in place (both the regulatory and Industry initiatives). 
Section 5 will try to identify all the discarding problems related to the different species and will try to put 
forward workable and effective solutions. 
Section 6 is the most difficult section in the plan as the PRAC will try to interpret the new rules of the 
CFP in the articles 14, 15 and 16, as to how they relate to the pelagic species. This section then goes on 
to deal with the implementation of these rules and will also cover necessary incentives to the 
stakeholders to change their fishing practices. 
Section 7 will deal with the Control and enforcement of the different measures proposed in the plans and 
how these can be verified to detailed and accurate documentation of all fishing trips. 
The final section will be the conclusions and the detailed recommendations that the PRAC is proposing 
in order to comply with the landing obligation. 
3.1.4 Conclusions and observations 
• The main conclusion of the Expert group is that in terms of phasing the implementation 
of the landings obligation, a time line based on species (rather than fisheries) is likely 
more tractable than a time line based on fisheries. The need to define fisheries will only 
be relevant if and when differential management actions are to be implemented, and in 
particular  
• For the areas mentioned in articles 15 1(c) and 15.1(d), some species are explicitly 
mentioned in terms of timeline, but some others are not (the species that do not define the 
fisheries). Member states would need to establish a time line for all those species. 
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• In some cases, the time line is defined according to a fishery with some species attached 
to it (15.1a), and in some other cases the time line is defined according to a species with 
some fisheries attached to it (15.1b-d). This can potentially create inconsistencies as some 
stocks will be either included or excluded depending on the fishery in which they have 
been caught. Member States would need to explicitly list all species and fisheries when 
establishing the time line.  
• When the timeline is defined by a fishery, one may need to consider how the fishery is 
defined during the transition period (e.g. before 1st January 2019), i.e. whether the fishery 
is defined by its intention (intended target species with a given gear*mesh size*area) or 
by its actual catch composition after completion of the trip. Both options are problematic. 
The intended target is not recorded in logbooks and therefore not known. On the other 
side, it may not be a desirable option to manage fisheries defined by their post hoc catch 
composition, as no regulation can be enforced on a fishing trip that has already taken 
place.     
• In mixed fisheries, there is no unique and simple solution on defining fisheries. Individual 
fishing activities and fishing vessels can be grouped in many ways for defining fisheries 
and fleets, and therefore the question requires a political trade-off on the agreed level of 
aggregation (“zoom in”) and grouping criteria.  
• Ultimately, management units should be of tractable size and number, and their definition 
should be in accordance with the availability of information that will be used to monitor 
and control them. 
• Defining fisheries based on their target species (“fishery for Norway lobster”) is 
intuitively meaningful, but in practice it is really difficult to define clear, robust and 
objective quantitative rules allowing individual fishing vessels and fishing trips to be 
allocated to such fisheries. Management units based on gear specifications are easier to 
manage and monitor, but they may ignore large differences in individual fishing and 
targeting patterns which could be relevant for de minimis applications.     
• There is no simple single solution for the accurate definition of fisheries. This may pose 
challenges when trying to differentiate management actions for different groups 
(fisheries) which will be required for e.g. the application of de minimis and survival 
exemptions).  Also, if there are different rules or different enforcement regimes between 
different fisheries, then this will create incentives to operate within the most attractive set 
of rules.  This “threshold effect” has been observed and is predictable. 
  
4 GUIDELINES FOR EXEMPTION BASED ON HIGH SURVIVAL (TOR 1B) 
Background  
Research has shown that some discards survive. In some cases, the proportion of discarded 
fish that survive can be substantial, depending on the species, the characteristics of the 
vessels and other operational, biological and environmental factors. Article 15 paragraph 2(b) 
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of the regulation allows for the possibility of exemptions from the landing obligation for 
species for which "scientific evidence demonstrates high survival rates, taking into account 
the characteristics of the gear, of the fishing practices and of the ecosystem”. 
EWG 13-16 concluded the selection of a value which constitutes “high survival” is subjective 
and likely to be species- and fishery-specific. The value will be based on “trade-offs” 
between the stock benefits of continued discarding and the potential removal of incentives to 
change exploitation pattern and how this contributes to the minimisation of waste and the 
elimination of discards. EWG 13-16 considered that avoidance of unwanted catch should be 
the primary focus of such considerations. Therefore, the choice of survival levels/value(s) in 
the context of article 15.2(b) will depend on which objective (e.g. avoidance of waste; 
improve stock sustainability; improve financial viability) is set as priority. 
Furthermore, the article notes that consideration must be given to the specific characteristics 
of the gear, fishing practices and of the ecosystem. Therefore such exemptions are likely to 
be metier specific which has implications in terms of the level of supporting information 
required in that exemptions should not only focus on the biological survivability of the 
species, but how the evidence of survival relates to the fishing activity. More specific details 
on the factors that can influence survival and how these may need to be considered can be 
found in the report of EWG 13-16.  
EWG 13-16 identified that these “trade-offs” are a construct of the following aspects which 
should be considered when deciding on the utility and appropriateness of exemptions based 
on high survival: 
• the estimated survival rate & its associated uncertainty; 
• the age structure of the discards and their survival rate at age; 
•  the relative importance of discards in the overall catch the relative importance of fishing 
mortality (including discard mortality) compared to natural mortality; 
• the impact of the landing obligation on the stock e.g. impact on fishing mortality and stock 
productivity; 
• the potential for improving selectivity and handling practices; 
• and the level of motivation for fishers to avoid unwanted catches. 
As a next step, EWG 13-17 has used these points to formulate guidelines suggesting the 
content of a Discard Plan where exemption is sought under Article 15 paragraph 2(b). It 
should be noted that these represent initial considerations of EWG 13-17 but further work to 
develop more detailed guidelines is being undertaken by an ICES expert group (Workshop on 
Methods for Estimating Discard Survival (WKMEDS)). 
EWG 13-17 suggests that a regional Discard Plan should initially set out the objectives for 
including an exemption from the landing obligation on the basis of high survival. This should 
take account of how the exemption will support the broader objectives of the landings 
obligation listed in Article 2(4a) and supporting recitals (18) of the new CFP and the broader 
overarching environmental, sustainability and precautionary objectives (articles 2.1; 2.2; 2.3) 
within the region. A description of the relative impacts of an approved exemption on the basis 
of high survival versus an obligation to land all catches could also be considered. 
EWG 13-17 suggests that other supporting evidence to enable the use of exemption under 
Article 15 paragraph 2(b) should include information on the management unit to which the 
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exemption is intended; the evidence supporting the estimated level of discard survival and the 
relevance of this evidence to the defined management unit.  
 
4.1.1 Providing Context and background: 
To guide this process EWG 13-17 have identified the following information that should be 
considered for inclusion in a regional Discard Management Plan where exemption under high 
survival is being proposed. It is acknowledged that more comprehensive supportive 
information may facilitate any evaluation process undertaken in determining the 
appropriateness of the use of Article 15 paragraph 2(b). 
 
1. Define the selected species for which the exemption is being sought. 
 
2. Define the stock or stocks of the selected species for which the exemption is being sought. This 
should be consistent with the stock(s) as defined in the management context and include the 
assessed status of the stock. 
 
3. Define the management unit (group of vessels) for which the exemption is being sought. The 
management unit description could include descriptions of: 
 
• the gear types employed (fishing method, net configuration, mesh sizes, selective devices etc); 
• the catch composition (volumes and proportions of species caught, categorised by discards 
and retained, including variability in catches where possible); 
• the operational characteristics of the management unit, for example, trip durations, tow 
durations or soak times, deck handling and catch sorting practices; 
• the variability within the defined management unit in the above. 
 
4. Describe the discard profile of the selected species including discard rate, age composition, 
seasonal and temporal patterns, confidence and variability in the data. 
 
5. Describe any selective measures developed, implemented, taken up and having potential to reduce 
catches of the selected species, including the provision of evidence of success and impact of these 
measures. 
 
6. Provide an evaluation of the effects of the landing obligation on the stock of the selected species 
compared with the effect of exemption under the high survival provision. This could include 
reference to the status of the stock in the context of management plans/objectives for this stock. 
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4.1.2 Evidence base requirements 
The description of the scientific evidence presented could include: 
• Details of the source of the information (for example, published papers, reports, newly 
acquired data). 
• Details of the experimental approaches applied to estimate discard survival (for example, 
captive observation, vitality assessment and/or tagging & biotelemetry), and justification of 
the selected methods. EWG 13-16 progressed the development of a framework to undertake 
survival studies. 
• A description of the experimental design, including the treatment of experimental and control 
specimens, and the level of replication. 
• Operational description and technical details of the fishing operations during the survival 
experiments if appropriate. 
• The representativeness of the experimental trials and data relative to the management unit as 
defined. This will include whether the data were obtained from the management unit as it is 
defined, from which components of the management unit were data generated and, the level 
of extrapolation of the results to enable the inclusion of the all components and activities of 
the management unit. 
• Details of the analyses and statistical methods used to generate estimated discard survival 
rates. This will include the methods used to decipher data generated by data storage tags 
(DSTs) and methods to identify factors influencing variability in survival rates. 
• Considerations given to estimating discard survival rates across the full age/length structure of 
the catch. 
• The identification of factors influencing survival (biological, environmental and operational), 
and the potential to introduce measures to enhance survival, including the cost implications 
for these measures. 
• The variability and confidence in the discard survival rate estimates. 
• A description of the potential limitations of the study, this will include details and 
implications of underlying assumptions. 
• A comparison of the results from new studies presented with outputs from other relevant 
studies. 
4.1.3 Monitoring and surveillance considerations 
A description of the defined management unit, and variability in the characteristics of the 
management unit to which the exemption would apply. This could include the spatial and 
temporal range of the defined management unit, the range in fishing gear specifications (e.g. 
mesh size range) and the range in fishing operations (e.g. range of tow durations or soak 
times and methods of handling and sorting the catch). 
A description of the mechanism by which the defined management unit will be monitored to 
ensure that the exemption is applied only to vessels within the management unit as defined. 
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A description of the methods used to meet the requirements of full documentation. This could 
include the methods to generate quantities and length and age structure of the discard 
component in cases where discard survival is not 100% (see section 6.1.2). 
A description of the method to supply and include discard mortality estimates in to the 
necessary stock assessment processes. 
4.1.4 Other considerations: 
Details of ongoing or future planned relevant work and the expected outputs from this work. 
This could include additional survival studies, selectivity developments and other operational 
investigations. 
A description of any other expected benefits or known risks (economic, environmental) of the 
provision of an exemption from the landing obligation on the basis of high discard survival. 
 
5 PROVISIONS FOR DE MINIMIS EXEMPTIONS (TOR 1) 
At the first meeting of the STECF EWG working on landing obligations (EWG 13-16) the de 
minimis provision was discussed at length and the consequences of various interpretations of 
the provision were examined.  
STECF EWG 13 17decided from the outset that the further discussion surrounding this TOR 
should not involve a revisiting of the interpretations of what ‘de minimis’ means in the 
context of the landing obligation or how de minimis quantities should be calculated. More 
important was a contribution to guidelines for use by the regional groups in their 
development of discard plans. Of particular importance was guidance on the preparation and 
presentation of information suitable for justifying the use of the conditionalities contained 
within the de minimis provision. 
The EWG 1317 maintained the view from the first meeting that the spirit and general purpose 
of the de minimis provision (‘a small discard proportion’) is to provide a ‘safety valve’ 
allowing for some discarding in the most difficult circumstances.  The group made the 
observation that a large number of de miminis cases would not be expected to be found in 
forthcoming discard plans and, as with exemptions for survival, the application of de minimis 
should be considered only after other technical or tactical approaches to avoid capture of 
unwanted catch in the first instance have been exhausted (Recitals 29 & 31 EU regulation 
1380/2013). 
By way of guidance, the EWG identified the need for regional groups to thoroughly review 
all the available options for reducing unwanted catches ahead of developing cases for 
justifying the conditionalities of the de minimis.  It was suggested that a hierarchical or 
decision tree approach could be developed to identify inter alia – cases where there was  an 
obvious or ‘easy’ solution, cases where changes in the quota management approach would be 
beneficial, opportunities for quota exchange or the use of flexibilities, spatial avoidance 
measures or adoption of new more selective gears.  The following schema identifies the 
possible flow and fate of catches following the introduction of the landings obligation 
highlighting where and under which circumstances de minimis catches could be legally 
discarded. 
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Table 5-1 Potential fate of catches under the Landings Obligation. 
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Such an approach would narrow down the number of cases requiring to be tested against the 
conditionalities.  Regional groups should also attempt to provide background information on 
the scale of the discard problem relative to the overall international catch and/ or the 
estimated stock size (the example provided under the part ii) disproportionate costs 
discussion indicates the type of information to provide). 
Having produced a relatively short list of candidate cases, the process of justifying 
conditionalities could then be pursued. Two conditionalities exist and guidance on these is 
discussed in turn: 
i) where scientific evidence indicates that increases in selectivity are very 
difficult to achieve; or 
ii) to avoid disproportionate costs of handling unwanted catches, for those 
fishing gears where unwanted catches per fishing gear do not represent more 
than a certain percentage, to be established in the plan, of total annual catch 
of that gear. 
 
5.1.1 “Selectivity very difficult to achieve” 
The previous EWG concluded that on a purely technical basis, there is scope for 
improvements in selectivity (or fish avoidance using other methods eg spatial). The difficulty 
for most fishing operations is that such improvements may lead to losses in revenue or 
increases in cost, rendering the improvements ’difficult to achieve’. Several examples of 
situations where technical solutions potentially lead to reduced economic viability were 
tabulated in the previous report and include: the problem of Norway pout in the Pandalus 
fishery; demersal fish species in the Nephrops fisheries of the Irish Sea and west of Scotland; 
demersal fish in some pelagic fisheries (e.g. the Baltic).  Given that it is the potential for 
negative and unsustainable economic impact associated with loss of commercial catch 
associated with changes in selectivity rather than the technical difficulty of improving 
selectivity, an approach making use of the ‘break even indicator’ was proposed as a tool for 
evaluating potential de minimis cases and testing the first conditionality (EWG 13-16). Here, 
this concept is explored further through real examples to show how the tool could be used by 
the regional groups. 
The break even revenue (BER) is the revenue required to cover both fixed and variable costs 
so that no losses are incurred and no profits are generated. The current revenue (CR) is the 
total operating income of the fleet segment, which consists of income from landings and non-
fishing income. Data on direct income subsidies should be excluded from the calculation. In 
addition, MS should decide whether income and expenditure from the lease of fishing rights 
should be included in the calculation or not (if either significantly affect profitability then the 
preference would be to include them).  This analysis is carried out from a fleet economic 
viability short term perspective rather than an individual vessel economic viability 
perspective (ie it doesn’t include investments and debt servicing etc) 
 
The formula for calculating the BER is as follows: 
 
BER = (Fixed Costs) / (1- [Variable costs / Current Revenue]) 
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Where: 
Variable costs =Crew costs + Unpaid labour + Energy costs + Repair and Maintenance 
costs + other variable costs 
 
And where: 
 
Fixed costs = Non variable costs + depreciation + opportunity cost of capital 
 
• The ratio (break even indicator) is calculated by dividing the current revenue by the 
BER i.e. 
 
Ratio = Current Revenue (CR) / BER 
 
The ratio between a fleets current revenue and break-even revenue shows how close the 
current revenue of a fleet is to the revenue required for the fleet to break even from an 
economic point of view. If the ratio is greater than 1, then enough income is generated to 
cover variable and fixed costs, indicating that the segment is profitable. Conversely, if the 
ratio is less than 1, insufficient income is generated to cover variable and fixed costs, 
indicating that the segment is unprofitable. If the CR/BER result is negative, this means that 
variable costs alone exceed current revenue, indicating that the more revenue is generated, 
the greater the losses will be. 
Two types of analysis are included as examples of how the break even indicator might be 
used.   The first analysis, using DCF data, calculates the % change in landings revenue which 
equates to different  CC/BER (break even indicator) values arising from various percentage 
changes in landings revenue (the changes could flow from adoption of avoidance or 
selectivity  measures).  Where actual selectivity data are not available to calculate impact of 
increases in selectivity on revenues, this approach provides a quick assessment of the 
sensitivity of a case to revenue change and therefore the extent to which ‘increases in 
selectivity is difficult to achieve’. 
In the example given below, the costs structures used in the analyses are published data for 
the years 2006-2012, which have been estimated based on sample data gleaned from vessels 
financial accounts. For the North Sea and West of Scotland demersal segments there is good 
sample coverage, always around or above 50% of all vessels in the segment, so they can be 
considered to be fairly representative. No consideration has been given to any potential 
increases in income that you would expect with an uplift, therefore the analysis presents a 
view of possible changes in BER but based on historic (by necessity) revenue information 
and therefore  considered  the impact on the CR/BER of a % decrease in revenue that you 
expect from increases in selectivity. Therefore, this could be viewed as a worst case scenario 
as it does not consider any possible increases that would occur with any future up lift in quota 
associated with the provisions of article 16. However, factoring in increased income from an 
uplift would not be straightforward as there may be additional costs associated with the fact 
that more fish was now getting landed e.g. more effort required to catch the additional fish, 
but the relationship is unclear and therefore difficult to factor into this analysis.   
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Here we use the Scottish demersal fishery as an example application of the BER. The 
Scottish demersal fishery is executed by a range of gear types (single/pair/twin trawl and 
single/pair seine), with a range of vessel lengths and power. This utilises available 
information on changes in catch rate arising from different gear selectivity options and uses 
fish ‘value’ information to calculate the predicted change in revenue. These changes are then 
fed into the break even indicator to test whether the CR/BER ratio drops below 1.  
Experimental catch comparison trials on a range of selective TR1 gears took place during 
2008 and 2010. The gears were classified into three categories in relation to their selectivity.   
For each fleet segment, species specific selectivity for each of the 4 gear categories and 
LPUE data were then used to calculate the annual percentage change in revenue that would 
be associated with using gears from each category. The segmentation is based on the 
approach followed in the Seafish financial survey of the UK fleet (Seafish, 2012) from where 
information on vessel costs is drawn. The five segments are classified as follows: (i) 
Demersal Trawlers > 24m (ii) Scottish seiners (iii) Pair seiners and pair trawlers (iv) 
Demersal Trawlers <24 m and over 300kW (v) Demersal Trawlers <24 m and under 300kW. 
 
Baseline Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4
Demersal > 
24m 
100 89 86 69
Demersal 
Seiners
100 90 83 74
Demersal pair 
trawl / seine
100 93 93 82
Demersal 
under 24m 
over 300kW
100 73 67 46
Demersal 
under 24m 
under 300kW
100 76 65 48
% change in revenue per day 
  
Table 5-2 Scottish whitefish fleet segment selectivity impacts on landings revenue 
 
 
 
 34 
  
Figure 0-1 Scottish North Sea and West of Scotland demersal trawl over 24m 
 
Figure 0-2 Scottish North Sea and West of Scotland demersal seine 
 
Figure 0-3 Scottish North Sea and West of Scotland demersal pair trawls and seines 
 
Figure 0-4Scottish North Sea and West of Scotland demersal trawl under 24m over 300kW 
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Figure 0-5 Scottish North Sea and West of Scotland demersal trawl under 24m under 300kW 
 
Unsurprisingly, the analysis shows that the greater the increase in selectivity, the greater the 
decrease in revenue, the lower the CR/BER is. It is worth noting however, that there are a 
number of other external factors that can affect the CR/BER such as fluctuations in fuel and 
quota leasing costs for example which may mean that in one year the business may be 
generating more than enough revenue to break even (>1), and less so in others (<1).  
The variability in the impact of each of the selectivity categories between the various gear 
and vessel segments is attributed to differences in species preferences between the segments 
and how the individual gear options affected the catch rates of the primary target 
assemblages, which differs between the fleet segments. For example, the use of the category 
4 gears has a greater impact on the larger demersal trawl segment in comparison to the single 
and pair seine as the cat. 4 modification also results in losses of monkfish and other flatfish 
species which are not the primary focus of the seine net segments.   
The analysis is based on the use of average information and does not provide any indication 
of the scale of variability within a given fleet segment meaning that even if the average 
CR/BER estimate is positive, the fleet segment may contain individual businesses that have 
CR/BER ratios of less than 1. Notwithstanding, the potential of the CR/BER approach is to 
identify selectivity options which would result in taking a fleet from a position of being 
nearly always profitable position into a permanently loss making one. 
This example provides a relatively simple ways of testing the conditionalities. In order to use 
this approach, however, some basic data on the economics of fishing operations are required. 
The EWG 13-17 suggests that in preparation for carrying out tests of conditionalities, 
regional groups could usefully be compiling relevant information. A similar process has 
already been undertaken in the North Sea regional group where a discard atlas illustrating the 
main discard problems is being finalised. In the case of the collation of economic 
information, some of this is already compiled as part of the DCF process and is already 
available in the STECF Annual Economic Report. These data are quite highly aggregated and 
may not be suitable for all situations but it is likely that within Member States those 
responsible for providing economic information could aggregate material at an appropriate 
level to test conditionalities relating to smaller units. 
Similarly, there is a need to compile available selectivity data. A meta-analysis would be 
beneficial providing a resource for the regional groups to utilise. This could be supplemented 
with new and emerging selectivity work. The limited availability of selectivity data suggests 
that initially, an analysis taking in as much information as possible is required.  
In some circumstances a discard issue may be common to several member states using the 
same gear and participating in the same fishery. In this case regional groups could consider 
the use of appropriately aggregated data to inform a collective test of the conditionality. 
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5.1.2 “Disproportionate costs”  
Here, the issue relates more to the handling of the unwanted catch, or storage of the catch.  
The EWG assumed the same interpretation of this conditionality as for the previous meeting. 
The disproportionate cost is assumed and the issue is to arrive at some discard percentage 
which will be permitted for a particular gear in a specific fishery. If a different understanding 
of this part of the regulation is assumed – one where the disproportionate cost is required to 
be demonstrated- then the approach described above for the first conditionality could be 
readily adapted. However, this is not attempted here.   
The process of arriving at an acceptable discard percentage for different gears under an 
assumption of disproportionate cost is complex and depends on the specificities of each 
fishery – EWG considered that defining specific values would be unhelpful. Instead, 
guidelines on the types of information to be considered and submitted in a regional discard 
plan were compiled.  EWG 13-17 suggests the following information should be supplied. 
Note that these are in addition to the actual level of de minimis to be applied which will need 
to be specified in the plan. 
 
1. Description of the problem in terms of: 
a. Management unit in terms of number of vessels  
b. Target Species and unwanted bycatch species 
c. Cause of disproportionate costs (e.g. as a  result of on board sorting and 
handling, for safety reasons relating to storage capacity on board and also 
related to damaged fish caused by depredation by marine mammals or other 
predators. 
d. Measures taken to reduce disproportionate costs in terms of improvement in 
selectivity/avoidance measures or to on board handling systems. 
. 
2. Total annual catches by species for the management units to which the exemption is 
to apply. 
3. Total levels of unwanted catches (we assume unwanted catches means unwanted 
catches of species subject to the landing obligation). 
4. Discard Rate in terms of total annual catches in the management unit 
5. Contribution to the total unwanted catches for all management units 
 
Summary of Guidelines 
• Explore and document all options for reducing discards before preparing applications 
for the use of de minimis 
• Use hierarchical or decision tree analysis to identify and eliminate cases which do not 
require the use of de minimis 
• Conditionality 1 –  improved selectivity (avoidance) too difficult – a) Regional groups 
should consider compiling and presenting background information surrounding the 
issue b) Regional Groups could utilise the  ‘break even indicator’ to evaluate whether 
the available technical solutions too difficult economically. This indicator may not be 
the only one capable of informing decisions on meeting the conditionality, and others 
could be employed. 
• Suggest regional groups begin compiling relevant economic and selectivity data now. 
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• Conditionality 2 – disproportionate costs – Regional groups should compile and 
present background information to illustrate problem and scale. 
 
6 GUIDANCE NOTES ON THE DOCUMENTATION OF CATCHES  
Background  
EWG 13-17 was asked to provide guidance to regional groups on issues relating to catch 
documentation. EWG 13-16, concluded that there are a number of control, monitoring and 
enforcement issues that will have significant influence on how successful the implementation 
of the landing obligation will be, particularly relating to the provision of reliable catch 
statistics which are used as a core input into stock assessments and the provision of scientific 
advice.  
The group addressed the ToR in two steps, firstly by providing considerations for the regional 
groups on what data is necessary to collect for achieving accurate and detailed documentation 
and secondly by providing considerations on how to verify that the documentation 
requirements are followed through enforcement actions.   
6.1.1 Documentation requirements  
It is expected that confidence in catch data needs to be sufficiently high in order to manage 
the outtake from stocks effectively and to provide accurate catch data for scientific purposes. 
This is particularly important where the management shifts fundamentally from the 
monitoring and control of landings to that of catch and incorporates potential for inter-species 
quota and other flexibilities and exemptions. Furthermore, to justify and manage any 
potential requests for quota uplifts due to consideration of previous discards (article 16.2) a 
high confidence in catch data is a prerequisite.    
The CFP stipulates that “Member States shall ensure detailed and accurate documentation of 
all fishing trips and adequate capacity and means, such as observers, closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) and others. In doing so, Member States shall respect the principle of 
efficiency and proportionality”. This provision should form the basic objective for the 
regional groups regarding catch documentation.  
From 2015 certain regulated species will be subject to a landing obligation in a phased 
approach, leading to a full landing obligation for all regulated species from 2019. Regional 
groups will need to consider how best to ensure that detailed and accurate data is collected 
during this transition in which some regulated species will continue to be discarded. At the 
full stage implementation of the landings obligation the following reporting categories are 
envisioned.  
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Current retained catch and discard documentation requirements are prescribed in the Control 
Regulation (EC 1224/2009). Paper and electronic logbooks form the basis of self reported 
catch records. Although in the case of the under 10m fleet self reporting is only mandatory if 
the Member State requires this. Verification of self reported catch data is currently carried out 
through monitoring and inspection programs at sea and landing inspections followed by 
administrative cross-checks with sales data ashore in order to deter or identify untimely, 
inaccurate or non-reporting of catches and effort.  
 
Under the landing obligation regional groups may need to consider if the current requirement 
for catch documentation and also the means of verifying catch documentation through 
monitoring and control, are appropriate. Enhanced measures may be necessary on a case-by-
case basis and in accordance with the level of risk posed by a given fishery or fleet. Where 
fleets from more than one MS share a common fishery, regional groups should consider the 
potential for a harmonised approach to monitoring requirements. 
EWG 13-17 suggests that the regional group consider including provisions for the following 
issues in the regional plans: 
 
• The Control Regulation stipulates that catch shall be recorded every 24 hours. Since 
discarding and retention takes place at each haul, consideration to requiring haul by 
haul documentation might usefully be given where this is practicable and 
compliments the ability to corroborate reported catches such as through the use of 
electronic monitoring.  As a generality, haul-by-haul documentation increases the 
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burden of compliance on fishermen. In order to minimise burden on fishermen, 
consideration might be given to requiring haul-by-haul documentation being 
maintained but with transmission frequency of 24 hours. 
 
• The Control Regulation allows for modifying logbooks during the entire fishing trip. 
Regional groups might usefully consider including a limit of 24-hour on the editing of 
log-sheets, and transmission of catch information when crossing the boundaries of 
relevant control areas would represent a substantial improvement in the confidence of 
reported data. 
 
• Article 14 of the Control Regulation is interpreted by most MS that catch and discards 
below 50 kg per species do not have to be recorded. That provision can result in 
missing information on discards, particularly where a relatively large number of 
vessels are catching small quantities of a large number of individual species. With this 
provision there is concern that accurate and detailed catch reporting may not be 
realized. For this reason, consideration might usefully be given to altering the 
applicability of the current 50 kg threshold per species to < 50 kg per trip and 
assessing the potential unaccounted catch associated with different threshold levels. 
  
• Regional groups should consider whether there is a requirement to reduce the 
threshold (vessel length) at which reporting in logbooks becomes mandatory or 
alternatively ensure that fisheries monitoring (observer) programs can capture this 
information independently through inter alia observers or electronic monitoring.  
 
• Current observer schemes have limited coverage (< 1% total fleet effort) and only 
used for the provision of discard estimates for assessment purposes. Under the landing 
obligation this data could potentially be used for the estimation and monitoring of 
quota uptake. It is therefore necessary that sampling protocols and observer 
programmes are designed so that they are properly aligned with fleet management 
units and that the estimates have an acceptable level of precision and accuracy.   
 
• De minimis provision is one that allows legitimate discards and no quota deduction. 
There therefore exists risk of overlogging non-de minimis discards as de minimis, and 
underlogging of true de minimis dicards to protect such provisions. Regional groups 
will need to establish a suitable means of monitoring the level of de minimis 
discarding where this applies to a given fishery. The degree of monitoring required 
should be assessed against the potential risks of the de minimis allowance being 
exceeded or where this flexibility may be open to abuse. This in-turn will depend on 
how de minimis is applied within that regional plan. As an example, if a regional 
group seeks to allow the discarding of severely damaged or contaminated fish within 
de minimis levels, consideration should be given as to how to prevent this flexibility 
being abused to allow inter alia high grading. 
 
• The data provided by catch documentation serve various purposes. Regional groups 
should also evaluate the potential for enhanced monitoring systems to generate more 
than just a method for verifying compliance but also the ability and efficacy of 
generating and contributing to the collection of biological data and whether this 
represents a cost-effective alternative or addition to existing data collection 
frameworks.  
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6.1.2 Verification of catch documentation 
There are a number of factors influencing the level of compliance with the requirement to 
document all catches (overall management structure, stakeholder involvement, penalty levels 
etc). EWG 13-17 considers that the management plans should incorporate a common regional 
approach to the various logistical challenges of meaningfully verifying the accuracy and 
completeness of documentation, i.e. a common control strategy should be developed at the 
regional level. A common regional approach to assessing risks, intensity of monitoring and 
controls, and enforcement actions to deal with non-compliance should also facilitate a level 
playing field.  
Real challenges exist for fishermen in accurately logging quantity of species. In highly mixed 
demersal fisheries that currently have high discards, fishers would have to devote significant 
time to sorting of undesired catches, including non-TAC species and fish <MCRS. Pelagic 
fishers might have different logistical challenges in estimating the quantity of fish discarded 
if slipped before being brought on-board. These challenges tend away from compliance with 
the landing obligation and the recording of discards, and the regional plan should strive 
towards finding a balance between the burden of compliance for the fisherman and the detail 
and accuracy of the documentation provided. A particular point here is the potential for fish 
survival to be compromised by efforts to ensure accurate documentation, e.g. where discards 
are collected for weight estimation before being returned to the sea. Regional groups should 
therefore consider whether enhanced electronic or observer monitoring programs can in fact 
assist the self-reporting by fishers. Discard plans should therefore also include provisions on 
how observer or EM programs will be used to enhance the potential for improvements to data 
accuracy.  
EWG 13-17 recognise that the current control tools currently described by the control 
regulations are based around landings-quotas and  limited in allowing meaningful verification 
of documentation of retained and discarded catch. In addition, available data show that there 
is poor compliance with the current obligation to record discards in logbooks (see EWG 13-
16). In order to ensure an acceptable level of accuracy and detail of the overall catch 
documentation in the region, EWG 13-17 considers that a risk assessment should be carried 
out at the regional level. Risk is here considered as of the probability of not complying with 
the requirement to accurately record all catches. Approaches to assessing the level of risk 
should be set out in regional discard plans together with the justification which may be 
evidence based or where there is uncertainty, taking a precautionary approach.  
The regional groups might usefully consider the following high risk factors when assessing 
the risk of non-compliance with the obligation for accurate documentation: 
 
• Fisheries with a high likelihood of unintended catches, hence a high impact of the 
landing obligation and a high burden of discard sorting and logging for the fishermen. 
• Fleet segments currently identified as having high discard rates and/or selectivity 
characteristics that are likely to result in significant catches of fish below MCRS. 
• Fleet segments engaged in fisheries that are known to have high-grading issues. 
• Fleet segments engaged in mixed-species fisheries where there is a risk of species 
specific limiting quota i.e. choke species (see section 0). 
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• Fisheries with history of previous compliance issues such as high-grading or miss-
reporting. 
• Fisheries where there is substantial differences in the catches logged by similar 
vessels/gear. 
• Fleets where analysis of observer data highlights differences in catch composition 
between vessels subject to observer coverage and vessels subject to self-reporting of 
catches. 
EWG 13-17 considers that it would be preferable that the justification of the selection of the 
enforcement tools to support the provision of fully documented catches should be clearly 
indicated in the regional plans. Regarding high risk fisheries full monitoring (CCTV and/or 
observers) are the only control methods which seem to offer the only effective approach to 
ensure all catches are documented and counted against quota.  
7 GUIDELINES FOR THE SELECTION OF MINIMUM CONSERVATION REFERENCE SIZES 
(TOR 1D & TOR 4) 
Introduction 
In line with the obligation to land all catches, there is a need to abolish current minimum 
landing sizes (MLS) as they would conflict with the requirement to land all catches as 
presently MLS regulations prohibit the landing of catches below the minimum size. In the 
new CFP MLS are to be replaced by Minimum Conservation Reference Sizes (MCRS).  
It is intended that current MLS values will simply be retained and renamed MCRS (Article 
4(17)). Until such time as the landings obligation is introduced, fish retained below MLS will 
continue to be discarded, but once incorporated into the landings obligation they must be 
landed and discounted against quotas but not sold for human consumption (Recital 30). 
STECF -12-20 noted that for  species  that  have  high  discard  mortality,  there  is  no  
empirical  evidence  to  show  the  use  of MLS  has  any  conservation  benefit  and  the  
rationale  behind  MLS  is  unclear, particularly  in  multi-species/multi-gear  fisheries.  There 
are many cases where there is a mismatch between MLS and gear selectivity and mismatch 
between species caught in the same fishery; this can significantly  contribute  to  discarding  
or  incentives  fixes  to  reduce  selectivity  to  avoid  loss  of  fish greater than the MLS.  
Furthermore, STECF 12-20 noted that the predominant reaction to minimum landing sizes, is 
to comply through discarding, particularly if moving to other areas would result in a 
reduction in potential revenue i.e. movement to an area with fewer marketable fish. In mixed 
species fisheries, the relationship between mesh size and minimum legal sizes is often more 
complex, where a single mesh size is used to select a range of species often with differing 
minimum landing sizes. In practice,  the  choice  of  minimum  landing  size  is  often  a  
compromise  to  discourage  the  retention  of small  fish  rather  than  one  based  on  
biological  suitability  e.g.  maturity and  it  is  hard  to  find  any biological justification for 
measures that in many instances are clearly conflicting e.g. input measures to control 
selectivity (mesh size) and output measures (MLS) to regulate the minimum size of fish that 
can be landed. 
Such factors may need to be considered if changes/abolition of current MLS when switching 
to MCRS are included in regional discard plans.  
While the basis of MCRS appear to be similar to the present MLS “established with the aim 
of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms” the obligation to land (and 
discount against quota) all fish below MCRS, if appropriately implemented, does introduce a 
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strong economic incentive to avoid capture of fish below MCRS as those catches will 
consume available quota and/or will create difficulties of storage without economic benefit. 
As such, applying MCRS could offer a tool to encourage avoidance of areas with elevated 
levels of juveniles or to use gears with appropriate selectivity. However, application of 
MCRS across a broad range of species in complex mixed-species fisheries may result in 
substantial uptake in catches below MCRS if not appropriately aligned with the selectivity 
characteristic of the main gears.  
EWG 13-17 has identified the following guidelines to assist in the setting of MCRS  
• The EWG considers that plans should clearly state the objectives for setting 
MCRS and that the primary objective should be in accordance with Article 4 
(17) and Article 15(10). The latter specifies that minimum conservation 
reference sizes may be established with the aim of ensuring the protection of 
juveniles of marine organisms. The EWG also considers that plans should also 
specify the metrics to be used to measure protection of juveniles. For example 
protection of juveniles may be determined through the reduction in fishing 
mortality on juveniles to a specified rate.  Notwithstanding the provision of 
Article 15(10), the group notes that additional objectives and accompanying 
justifications may also be proposed. 
• If there is no provision to include a MCRS in the plan for stocks for which a 
MLS currently exists, provision of supporting information to justify the 
absence of a MCRS would inform the decision on whether to accept such a 
provision and the EWG considers that such information should accompany the 
plan. 
• For those stocks that are not currently subject to a MLS, the EWG considers 
that supporting information to justify the introduction of a MCRS would 
inform the decision on whether to accept such a provision and that such 
information should accompany the plan. 
• The EWG considers that plans should provide information to demonstrate that 
the introduction of the proposed MCRS is likely to achieve the stated 
objectives. Such information, where possible, should include results of 
simulations.   
 
7.1.1 Supporting information on the use and selection of minimum sizes  
Setting appropriate MCRSs 
Given that the aim of setting MCRSs is to protect juveniles (Article 15(10), it would be 
appropriate to set the MCRS at the size above which a certain proportion of fish are mature. 
However, noting that sustainable exploitation of juveniles can be achieved if the exploitation 
rate is appropriate, the choice of the proportion of immature fish to be protected needs to be 
determined on a case by case basis taking into account the likelihood of meeting MSY 
objectives. An assessment of the likely impact of any proposed MCRS should form part of 
proposed discard or management plans. Furthermore, an assessment of whether setting 
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MCRSs on a species basis is likely to result in the desired level of protection for the juveniles 
of such species if they are exploited in mixed fisheries would be particularly informative. 
Justification for changing from MLS 
The EWG considers that the first step in the approach is to identify whether the introduction 
of a MCRSs that differs from currently-established MLSs is desirable, would be to identify 
those fishery management units that currently have high discards and identify the reasons that 
such discards arise. For example, discards can arise for a number of reasons which include 
inter alia discards arising as a result of compliance with currently-established MLSs or due to 
quota restrictions.  For those fishery management units for which the primary reason for 
discarding is a result of compliance with currently-established MLSs, Regional groups may 
then wish to consider whether they wish to introduce a MCRS, whether it should differ from 
the current MLS and is likely to achieve the principle aim of ensuring the protection of 
juveniles of marine organisms (Article 10).  
The EWG notes that there are a variety of issues that regional groups may wish to take into 
account when considering the desirability of introducing a MCRS. The following 
classification includes a number of examples of such issues.  
Market issues  
• To preserve current markets e.g. set low MCRS because market for small/juvenile fish is 
strong – economic argument? 
• To avoid small/juvenile fish on market so that price of large fish is maintained  
• Prevent development of new markets for e.g. small/juvenile fish 
• Increase revenue by reducing MCRS for stocks where e.g. price/kg for small/juvenile fish is 
higher than for large fish. 
• Increase revenue returns e.g. by setting a relatively high MCRF so that more of the catch can 
be sold for purposes other than direct human consumption and at the same time maintain 
high prices for larger fish to be sold for direct human consumption. Such an approach may 
encourage the avoidance of lower value fish below the MCRS in the catch  which may in turn 
give rise to higher catches of higher value fish in the longer-term. 
Societal/Ethical drivers 
• Protection of juveniles. However, protection of juveniles cannot be achieved through MCRS 
alone.  Protection of juveniles i.e. eliminating or reducing F on juveniles will only result if the 
exploitation pattern on juveniles is modified. 
• Modify the proportion of the catch that can be used for direct HC by setting a low MCRS 
thereby “reducing waste”. 
Biological/ecological drivers 
• To encourage a change in exploitation pattern for example to realise the growth potential of 
the stock and/or to reduce the fishing mortality on juveniles. A change in exploitation pattern 
may be achieved because of the additional costs of handling catches that earn less or no 
money than those above the MCRF. 
8 CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE EVALUATION OF REGIONAL DISCARD PLANS (TOR 1.F) 
There was insufficient time available to fully consider potential indicators for future 
evaluations of the landing obligation and to assess the performance of individual regional 
discard plans. However, EWG 13-17 consider this is an important aspect that should be 
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considered within regional discard plans and work should progress on this aspect and this 
might be best achieved through a dedicated expert group or contract.  
9 CHOKE SPECIES (TOR 4) 
Introduction 
The introduction of the landing obligation will present a number of operational challenges to 
both mangers and the industry. One of the key impacts when moving from the regulation of 
landings to the regulation of catches is the issue of choke species. Presently, businesses 
engaged in mixed species fisheries are permitted to continue fishing even if some quotas have 
been exhausted and fishing opportunities remain for others. Where quotas have been 
exhausted, businesses must discard all catches of that particular species, leading to “over-
quota” discards. One of the key elements of the landings obligation is to prevent this 
occurring, which means that unless tactical or technical adaptations are deployed to avoid 
quota exhausted species, then fishing activity must cease, thereby ‘choking’ any further 
activity. The scale and extent of this issue is dependent on a number of factors including 
quota availability and the ability of the business to respond to minimise or avoid uptake 
(catch) of quota limiting species while maintaining economic viability. A number of recent 
studies have explored the potential rate of choke given existing quota allocations, including 
scenarios which factor in additional allocation quota (quota uplift), where in future fishing 
opportunities will be set with consideration of current discard rates (Recital 32).  
 
Four studies into likely impacts of a landings obligation were presented to and discussed by 
the EWG.   The four studies are: 
 
1. UK fleet segment-based case studies 
2. English otter trawl study 
3. Economic effects of a landing obligation for Dutch fisheries 
4. Study of Scottish whitefish pair trawlers engaged in Fully Documented Fisheries trials 
 
 
Study 1. 
 
Findings of a study conducted by Poseidon ARM Ltd in conjunction with Seafish were 
presented to the meeting.  The analysis uses 2012 data to present what might have happened 
with choke species for 3 case study fleet segments if the landings obligation had applied to 
both target and by-catch species in 2012.  The study is due to be published in January by 
Seafish  
 
The objectives of the study were to address the following questions:  
1. How would the landing obligation affect fleet economic performance?  
2. At fleet level, given current discards, what would the quota requirements amount to? 
3. Are there ‘choke’ species that could limit operations of the fleet?  
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The model for the study considers the implications of the discard ban for specific fisheries in 
terms of the fleet's average economic performance.  It combines published data on landings, 
quota use, cost & earnings and recent discard rates to identify likely 'choke' species.  The 
model estimates average economic performance of the selected fleet segments considering 
the various allowances and exemptions being proposed in the landing obligation. 
 
The model does not explore changes in fishing patterns that might be expected with the 
introduction of the landing obligation (changes to selectivity, etc.). The coping strategies 
employed by individual vessel operators will depend on their specific quota unit holdings or 
access to further quota unit, which vary enormously throughout each fleet segment. 
 
The model results highlight priority issues to be addressed in each case study fishery.  The 
model has not been used to attempt to anticipate the likely approaches and actions that may 
be employed by management authorities to help mitigate the economic impact of the landings 
obligation. 
 
Some of the key assumptions used in the model can clearly affect the results of the different 
scenarios and sensitivity analysis would be useful.  Assumptions include a constant rate catch 
per day at sea within fleet segments, with no seasonality adjustments throughout the year.  It 
is also assumed that the fleet segments have access to all the UK quota if needed.  This 
assumption was used in part because there is no public record of quota unit allocations per 
fleet segment.  This assumption is clearly unrealistic and the results generated under it can be 
considered to be optimistic. 
 
Results of the UK fleet case studies: 
Irish Sea (Area VIIa) Nephrops Trawl Fleet (Table 9-1) 
• Key ‘choke’ = whiting.  UK VIIa quota would have been used up after 10 fishing days 
(avg over 3 years) 
• Leasing - Low UK TAC for VIIa whiting (32 tonnes), vs. EU TAC = 84 tonnes. Leasing 
in all additional EU VIIa whiting quota would only give another 24 days fishing. Not 
enough quota in the EU TAC to keep this fleet segment fishing and viable. 
• Uplift – 75% or more of current VIIa whiting discards would ensure fleet could continue 
to operate.  Estimated 293 tonnes of VIIa whiting discarded by fleet in 2012.  
• ‘Flexibility’ - converting 9% of Nephrops quota (552 tonnes) to cover landings of whiting 
gives fleet enough quota to remain viable and fish for 130 days. But, VIIa whiting is a 
data-limited stock, not within safe biological limits, ICES advising lowest possible catch 
for 2014.  Flexibility to use target species quota to cover landings of whiting is unlikely.  
• De minimis – If this exemption is equal to 5% of all of the fleet’s quota catch, fleet is 
viable.  If equal to 5% of UK VIIa whiting, gives only 2 more fishing days. Definition of 
the exemption is key, plus there is a need to justify use of de minimis 
• Conclusion: This fleet should now prioritise improving selectivity to catch Nephrops but 
avoid whiting, while maintaining current selectivity in terms of cod-avoidance.  
•  
North Sea mixed whitefish trawl fleet (Table 9-2) 
• Leasing – Expenditure on quota leasing would increase by 500%. 25% decrease in profit 
• Key ‘choke’ in 2010-12 = hake, secondary choke = saithe, cod and haddock 
• Uplift – based on ICES estimates and conservative 20% uplift where no ICES uplift 
advice, fleet still profitable if uplift applied also to swaps, otherwise problem 
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• Flexibility – target quota stock debatable. If can use an under-utilised stock (plaice) to 
cover choke species, profits could actually increase, if haddock used as target, likely 
profits would have decreased  
• De minimis – If equal to 5% of all of the fleets quota catch, slight reduction in profits. If 
equal to 5% of hake, around 80% of status quo days available to the fleet  
• Conclusion: Again, current swaps critical, but likelihood of getting them is questionable; 
limited additional selectivity improvements possible before loss of target catch. 
Combination of measures would likely maintain fleet viability 
 
North Sea Nephrops Trawl Fleet (Table 9-3) 
• Leasing – expenditure on leasing would have increased by 250%, profit margins would 
have decreased, but fleet segment would still be viable. 
• Key ‘choke’ = hake (all years without swaps), or whiting (2010 after swaps), saithe (2011 
after swaps) and cod (2012 after swaps)  
• Uplift – based on ICES estimates and conservative 20% uplift where no ICES uplift 
advice, fleet still profitable if uplift applied also to swaps, otherwise there is a problem 
• ‘Flexibility’  - converting 9% of Nephrops to cover choke species reduces profitability but 
fleet is viable  
• De minimis – If equal to 5% of all of the fleet’s quota catch, slight reduction in profits. If 
equal to 5% of hake, less than 50% of status quo days available to the fleet  
• Conclusion: Ensuring that current swaps continue is critical, but may not be possible 
since other MS will have higher need for their own quota which they previously 
(currently) are willing to swap away. Combination of flexibility measures would likely 
maintain fleet viability.  
 
 
Note that, for North Sea, discard estimates were based on CEFAS and Marine Scotland data, 
but estimates are markedly different.  Assumed discard rates could have a key impact on 
outcomes in modelling and in reality. 
Assumptions about sales prices for species previously considered being by-catch are key to 
sensitivity analysis of what fishing patterns could be viable / profitable. 
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Table 9-1  Irish Sea Nephrops 'choke' species in 2012 (avg. days at sea 138).  NB quota uplift refers to an uplift based on the average volume of discards being added 
to the existing landings based TAC 
Species Tonnes Scenario 3: choke species Scenario 4: Quota uplift 
Area VIIa 
Initial NI 
quota 
allocation 
Quota 
change 
in Year 
Year end 
NI quota 
Catch per 
day 
Fishing days 
before NI quota 
exhausted 
Fishing days 
before UK 
quota exhausted 
Fishing 
days with 
25% uplift 
Fishing 
days with 
50% 
uplift 
Fishing 
days with 
75% uplift 
sole  12.75  -0.3   12.5  0.07  171  NA 
      
plaice  223.67   11.7   235.4  3.14  75  130 159 188 217 
cod  92.76   11.1   103.9  0.71  146  NA 
   
whiting  28.53   4.2   32.7  2.17  15.07  15 49 83 116 
saithe  120.07  -33.7   86.4  0.00  22,597  NA       
anglers  333.32  -139.2   194.1  0.89  219  NA       
megrim  31.42  -1.1   30.3  0.00  11,148  NA       
haddock  498.45  -13.0   485.4  1.89  257  NA       
hake  680.10  -560.9   119.2  0.47  254  NA       
pollack  292.76  -64.0   228.8  0.09  2,610  NA 
      
Nephrops  6,646.60   596.4   7,243.0  51.29  141  162 
      
skates & rays  146.19   6.2   152.4  2.23  68  863       
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Table 9-2. North Sea Mixed Whitefish Trawl 'choke' species, 2012 (avg. days at sea 154) 
Species Tonnes Scenario 3: choke species Scenario 4: Quota uplift 
Area VIIa 
Initial 
quota 
allocation 
Quota 
change in 
Year 
Year 
end 
quota 
Catch per 
day 
Fishing days 
before UK 
quota 
exhausted 
Fishing days 
from swaps 
Fishing days 
after swaps 
% quota 
uplift 
(ICES 
advice) 
Fishing days 
with quota  
uplift (from 
ICES) 
haddock  26,644   1,075   27,719  185.60  144  6 149 12% 166 
cod  11,276   2,045   13,320  92.38  122  22 144 30% 181 
whiting  10,539   446   10,985  68.95  153  6 159 52% 238 
saithe  6,318   1,821   8,139  71.04  89  26 115 20%* 132 
plaice  22,542  -3,599   18,943  128.43  176  -28 147 43% 223 
hake  466   1,385   1,851  17.20  27  81 108 20%* 113 
anglers  8,209  -351   7,858  38.25  215  -9 205 0% 205 
megrim  1,952  -16   1,936  10.81  181  -1 179 18% 211 
Nephrops  21,175  -1,340   19,835  71.38  297  -19 278 4% 291 
lemons  3,905  -56   3,849  10.29  379  -5 374 20%* 449 
dabs  1,588   64   1,652  8.65  184  7 191 20%* 227 
turbot  717  -202   515  3.10  231  -65 166 0% 166 
skates & rays  989  -215   774  5.15  192  -42 150 20%* 188 
sole  803   414   1,217  4.67  172  89 260 20%* 294 
*20% is assumed for stocks for which there is no ICES advice for uplift in quota 
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Table 9-3 North Sea Nephrops Trawl 'choke' species, 2012 (avg days at sea: 143) 
Species Tonnes Scenario 3: choke species Scenario 4: Quota uplift 
Area VIIa 
Initial 
quota 
allocation 
Quota 
change in 
Year 
Year end 
quota 
Landings 
2012 
Catch per 
fishing day 
Fishing days 
before UK quota 
exhausted 
Fishing days 
after swaps 
% quota 
uplift (ICES 
advice) 
Fishing days 
with catch 
quota (based 
on ICES) 
haddock  26,644.00   1,075   27,719   27,302  288.25  92  96 12% 106 
cod  11,275.56   2,045   13,320   12,190  152.82  74  87 30% 109 
whiting  10,539.00   446   10,985   9,865  101.80  104  108 52% 161 
saithe  6,318.00   1,821   8,139   7,714  64.00  99  127 20%* 147 
plaice  22,542.00  -3,599   18,943   17,018  157.30  143  120 43% 182 
hake  466.01   1,385   1,851   1,827  20.65  23  90 20%* 94 
anglers  8,209.00  -351   7,858   4,920  45.49  180  173 0% 173 
megrim  1,952.00  -16   1,936   1,390  12.86  152  151 18% 177 
Nephrops  21,175.06  -1,340   19,835   10,993  76.87  275  258 4% 270 
lemons  3,905.00  -56   3,849   1,457  12.64  309  304 20%* 366 
dabs  1,588.00   64   1,652   706  7.93  200  208 20%* 248 
turbot  717.00  -202   515   477  4.41  162  117 0% 117 
skates & rays  989.00  -215   774   662  6.12  162  126 20%* 158 
sole  803.02   414   1,217   601  4.26  188  285 20%* 323 
*20% is assumed for stocks for which there is no ICES advice for uplift in quota 
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Study 2. 
The short-term impacts of implementing catch quotas and a discard ban on English North Sea 
otter trawlers. (Condie et al, 2013) 
 Summary of key points from report: 
The objective of the study was to calculate potential changes in fishing effort, landings, and profits 
with catch quotas for English North Sea otter trawlers.  The study used logbook data, detailing 
landings, income, and fishing effort by trip and data on discards from the CEFAS observer programme 
(COP).  Data used was from 2010. 
The fleet was separated into six vessel segments (by vessel length, engine size and target (either 
Nephrops or whitefish) to reflect economics data.  
Model: 
• CQs for four main species: cod, haddock, whiting and plaice; set at 75% of discard rate to uplift 
landings quotas. 
• Increased quota distributed equally among the fleet segments. 
• Each species analysed individually and in four combinations of species. 
• Fulfilment of any catch quotas stopped fishing. 
• No banking/borrowing or substitution scenarios analysed. 
 
Scenarios: 
1. No behaviour change (random selection of trips without replacement) 
2. Adopting selective gear – applying data on changes in catch composition from published gear 
trials.  
3. Optimal trip selection (based on operating profits and quota uptake) 
4. Least optimal trips (based on operating profits and quota uptake) 
 
Results: 
1) No behaviour change 
Fleet discard proportions of cod and whiting were 19 and 28% higher than the ICES estimate, resulting 
in the largest reductions in fishing effort, of up to 16%, under catch quotas for cod and whiting. 
Haddock discard proportions lower than ICES. 
Effort reductions were greatest under a catch quota for whiting, resulting in fall operating profits of up 
to 15% (0-15%) compared with landings quota regime. 
There were variations in the impact of catch quotas in different vessel segments. For example, <10m 
vessels discarded a higher percentage of plaice than whitefish vessels under 300 kW in engine power 
and therefore demonstrated larger fall in profits. 
2)  Vessels adopting selective gear: relative to the ‘no behaviour change’ scenario showed no overall 
increase in profits. 
Gears: Nephrops: Cutaway trawl; 120 mm codend; inclined separator panel; modified square mesh 
panel; Swedish grid with/without square mesh codend. Fish trawls: Orkney trawl, Eliminator trawl. 
Why? This is due to the loss of marketable fish with these gears. We assumed the gears would be used 
all of the time and could not be enhanced or improved by the skippers. Combinations selected. 
3)  Optimised trips: The highest ranked trips were those catching the least undersized regulated 
species and those catching the most unregulated species. Demonstrated marginal increase in profits. 
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4)   Least optimised trips: provided a worst case scenario, the most restricted species were utilised 
first, resulting in substantial decreases in profits (up to 82%). 
Conclusions: In general the level of incentive (for changing selectivity/non-compliance) increases 
with how much higher the vessel discard rate is from the uplift received, but it depends... 
Assumptions and considerations Selection of fleet (species defining the 
fishery) 
Variability/representativeness of discard 
estimates 
Potential to manipulate catch composition 
(selectivity) 
Uplift  level (% of discards => catch quota) Representativeness  of gear trial data 
Distribution of uplift within the fleet Markets for fish <CRS 
Foregone catches Logistic costs of landing <CRS fish : storage, 
transport etc  
Market prices: in general and particularly of 
previously discarded >MLS fish 
Access to available quota 
Variability/confidence in operating costs Banking/borrowing and substitutions 
de minimis Effort restrictions 
 
Study 3. 
Economic effects of a landing obligation for Dutch fisheries (Buisman et al, 2013) 
Key findings 
The total net costs of the introduction of a landing obligation for the Dutch fishing fleet are estimated 
to amount to between 6 and 28 million euros, depending on the way in which the quotas are modified 
and the prices of the by-catches to be landed. In this regard, it is assumed that the catch composition 
and all fishing activities will be the same as in the baseline year (2011). This study therefore says 
nothing about how fishermen could modify their fishing activities in order to reduce the costs of the 
landing obligation, and what the effects of such a modification would be. 
In the event that the catch quotas remain the same as the current quotas plus discards (scenario 1), the 
costs of the landing obligation for the entire Dutch offshore fishing fleet would amount to between 6 
and 14 million euros. By far the largest share of these costs would be borne by the cutter sector. The 
additional revenues from the landed by-catches are greatly dependent on sales prices, and do not 
compensate for the extra costs incurred to land the by-catches. The additional costs for full monitoring 
of all fishing trips by means of cameras would amount to approximately 6 million euros. The costs of 
observers on all trips would amount to approximately 18 million euros. The costs of enforcement may 
be lower if less than 100% of vessels and trips are checked. 
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In scenario 2, in which it is assumed that the catch quotas will be equal to the current landing quotas, 
the net costs of the introduction of a landing obligation would be between 23 and 28 million euros, 
excluding any additional costs relating to checks. In this scenario, too, the largest share of the costs 
would be borne by the cutter sector. 
 
In 2011, the total volume of discards of quota species in the Dutch fisheries sector amounted to more 
than 57,000 tonnes, of which around 47,000 tonnes were in the cutter fishing sector and just under 
10,000 tonnes were in the pelagic sector. 
The market survey carried out demonstrates that a selling price of between €0.15/kg and €0.30/kg can 
be expected for landed by-catches. 
Scenario 2 and choke species 
Scenario 2: Fishing quotas are equivalent in size to the current landing quotas.  As the total catches are 
considerably higher than the current landings (and quotas), it is in this scenario, the species for which 
quotas are fully be used, not possible to land all current catches.  If the selectivity of fishing does not 
improve, there will be so much of some species that less undersized fish can be landed. At the time 
that the quota of a specific species, which cannot be avoided completely, has been used (choke 
species), and escape clauses such as the 9% rule are utilized, fisheries should be stopped and even less 
of the other species can be landed. 
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Table 3.5 Scenario 2. Catches an quota for the Dutch cutterfleet 
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  Euro- 
cutters 
Cutters 
>300 hp 
Total    
 Rays  258   69   1,376   1,445   1,373  0.2 3 
 Langoustine   1,103   2,055   582   2,637   2,505  0.4 6 
 Dab and flounder   11,421   4,153   21,204   25,357   24,089  0.5 6 
 Plaice  31,024   6,018   43,079   49,097   46,642  0.7 8 
 Whiting   1,401   498   1,385   1,883   1,788  0.8 10 
 Lemon sole and 
witch flounder  
 853   74   788   863   819  1.0 13 
 Turbot and brill   2,579   259   2,260   2,519   2,393  1.1 13 
 Sole   10,867   1,158   7,807   8,965   8,516  1.3 16 
 Cod  2,255  198   1,497   1,695   1,610  1.4 17 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows the catches in 2011 compared to the quota for that year. The relationship between 
quotas and catch is lowest for rays (0.2). The quotas have been exhausted for rays by around March. 
At that time, only less than 25% of the current plaice and sole catches would have been taken.  
Fisheries may still not be stopped immediately upon catching choke species quotas, the 9% rule still 
offers the possibility of some delay. 
According to this rule, 9% of the plaice quota (2,800 tons) and sole quota to date (975 tonnes) could be 
used for landing catch. This would mean that rays would be no longer a problem because the total 
volume of the catch is low.  The next choke species is dab.  The quota for this is fished by June.  At 
that time, approximately 360 tonnes of skate could be landed within the plaice quota.  So there is still 
space for 2,440 tons of dab and ray.  It takes about 1.2 months before 9% of the plaice quota is taken 
for this.  By mid-July fishing must be closed.  Meanwhile the plaice quota is almost fully taken (83% 
plaice catches plus 10% of dab and rays). 
 
 
Study 4. 
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Marine Scotland study.   Demersal Landing Obligation Trial  
 
Summary of key points from Marine Scotland report: 
 
A pair team of demersal vessels, using a mesh size of 120mm+ and fishing in the North Sea, 
participated in a fully-documented landing obligation trial for all demersal species.  The vessels had a 
quota uplift for several species in line with estimated of Scottish fleet discard rates and had to land all 
demersal catch.  
 
The trial provided valuable insight into the pressure of choke species and financial consequences of 
leasing-in quota to cover non-target and unwanted catches.  
 
The main objectives of the trial were:  
• to identify the potential impacts of the landing obligation including, e.g., any ‘choke’  species and 
the extent to which behavioural change could reduce unwanted catch;  
• to provide information on the expected sizes and quantities of catches and subsequent increase in 
quantities landed to inform our work with the onshore sector to help them prepare for the landing 
obligation;  
• to build on our current experience from existing FDF schemes to help Marine Scotland work, in 
collaboration with vessels, towards the introduction of a workable demersal discard ban. 
 
The owner of the participating vessels chose by-catch reduction gear with a 130mm codend of 5mm 
double twine with no top or bottom chafers, which was a modified Orkney trawl with 300mm mesh in 
the top and bottom wing sheets and 300mm mesh in the top sheet. 
 
The average size of haddock targeted by the Scottish fleet is smaller than cod, saithe and hake.  A 
widespread abundance of cod, saithe and hake on the grounds traditionally fished by the Scottish fleet 
made it challenging to catch the target haddock without catching these other species; attempting to 
avoid either cod, hake or saithe often resulted in catching one of the other species.  The vessels moved 
grounds to try to avoid concentrations of hake, saithe and cod (fishing pattern confirmed by VMS 
data).  
 
As the trial progressed the skippers could not target smaller haddock whilst using effective selective 
strategies for the other three species and remain economically viable. By the third trip the vessels had 
used all their hake quota and within five weeks of the start of the trial the vessels had caught c.36 
tonnes of hake.  This was substantially beyond the level of catch the Producer Organisation could 
support as they had already exhausted their initial allocation of North Sea hake before August and 
could not lease more hake quota. Hake therefore proved to be a key ‘choke’ species.  
 
It would cost c.£600/tonne to lease in additional saithe when the market price for small saithe was only 
c.£600 - £900/tonne. This would represent a net loss after the costs of crewing, provisioning and 
maintaining the vessels were included, so leasing in quota was not an economically viable option. A 
month into the trial, the owner of the participating vessels was offered the opportunity to convert some 
haddock quota uplift into saithe and hake, to reflect quota convertibility provisions within the revised 
CFP.  However, the skipper felt that this would (a)not be enough to cover the hake catches for the 
remainder of the year, and (b)would not allow him to remain profitable in a competitive market where 
others were still able to discard.  
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As a result of the enormous challenges of moving directly to a full landing obligation with only 
restricted flexibilities the trial concluded early.  The short trial period of the trial limited the data on 
actual catches when operating under a landing obligation.  
 
Conclusions 
a) Choke species 
This trial showed that there are likely to be significant challenges in operating under a landing 
obligation due to choke species, even where current quota levels are increased by current discard rates 
relevant to the specific fishing fleet.  Hake ‘choked’ the system very quickly, particularly due to a lack 
of available quota to lease or swap in.  
 
Furthermore, the financial consequences of covering catches over and above the quota uplift became 
particularly apparent for saithe.  The cost of leasing quota approached, or exceeded, the sale price of 
the fish, resulting in a projected financial loss once operating costs are taken into account for this 
species.  
 
b) Unwanted catch 
It is possible to be very selective with regards to juveniles, with very little catch below Minimum 
Landing Size even when whilst targeting small haddock. Approximately 1% of the catch was juvenile 
fish.  The terms and conditions of the trial required that this fish could not be sold for human 
consumption.  Fish below Minimum Landing Size, damaged fish and fish otherwise unsellable were 
sold as bait to potters and creelers.  It seems possible that this market could absorb considerable 
quantities of unwanted catch once the landing obligation comes into effect.  This could be useful as 
catches below the new Minimum Conservation Reference Sizes will not be able to be sold for human 
consumption.  
 
c) Enforcing a full landing obligation  
The FDF system used for this trial appears to be an effective tool capable of detecting discarding on 
demersal vessels.  However, whilst the system also works well for a single-species discard ban (i.e. the 
North Sea cod FDF scheme), we have not yet trialled the system under a multi-species partial discard 
ban (i.e. just for cod, haddock, whiting and saithe), where the bulk of fish may create new challenges.  
 
 
References to studies/reports: 
 
1. Cappell, R & Macfadyen, G., 2013. A case study review of the potential impact of proposed CFP 
discard reform. Poseidon report to Seafish UK, 2013 available at: 
http://www.seafish.org/media/Publications/Poseidon_Landings_Obligation_Economic_Impact_JA
N_2014_FINAL.pdf 
 
2. English otter trawl study. Condie, H. M., Catchpole, T. L., and Grant, A. 2013. The short-term 
impacts of implementing catch quotas and a discard ban on English North Sea otter     trawlers. – 
ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi:10.1093/icesjms/fst187 available at: 
http://icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/11/14/icesjms.fst187.abstract  
 
3. Economic effects of a landing obligation for Dutch fisheries (in Dutch - English summary provided 
to the EWG by Martin Pastoors).  Economische effecten van een aanlandplicht voor de 
Nederlandse visserij, Buisman, Erik, Hans van Oostenbrugge en Rik Beukers, LEI-rapport 2013-
062, ISBN/EAN: 978-90-8615-657-3, 48 p., fig., tab., bijl. available at: 
http://www.wageningenur.nl/upload_mm/e/e/3/a69460d8-2bc5-42be-a6f9-
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4. Study of Scottish whitefish pair trawlers engaged in Fully Documented Fisheries trials. Demersal 
Landing Obligation Trial, Marine Scotland, November 2013, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00438386.pdf  
 
EWG Observations  
The reports summarised above are useful in helping to identify some of the challenges regarding choke 
species that are facing those responsible for preparing discard plans. 
 
These reports do suggest that there is a risk of choke species having a large negative effect on fishing 
if access to quota issues cannot be resolved.  In many cases there may be businesses unable to continue 
trading and large quantities of quota uncaught if choke species take the effect highlighted in these 
reports.  For instance, it was suggested that, as matters stand, Spanish vessels currently used to fishing 
in waters west of Scotland and Ireland have zero access to quota for 7 choke species, and if these 
vessels are unable to obtain quota for these species, they will not be able to fish there at all after the 
landings obligation is in effect for all species.   
 
Analyses conducted show how difficult it will be in some cases to allow existing vessels to remain in 
business.  In some cases, substantial changes in practice will be required in order for businesses to 
remain profitable while observing the landings obligations. 
 
All methods used in the analyses considered relied on very important assumptions which may not 
represent the reality, and, depending on the assumptions used, may lead to very different conclusions. 
However, without a large margin of flexibility (e.g. interpreting the minimis on total TAC or 9% 
flexibility in transferring e.g. Nephrops for whiting) there could possibly be a substantial and 
unsustainable loss in profitability for vessel businesses. 
 
Use of the de minimis exemption will be crucial in some cases and could mean the difference between 
vessels remaining in business or not.  The interpretation of the regulation, particularly 5% of what, 
exactly, can legally be discarded, may have substantial effects on businesses.  Also, the order of 
application of the exemptions may be important, eg. if species swap of 9% is applied first and then 5% 
permitted discards is applied after that. 
 
It might not be possible to take a sea basin or regional approach to discard plans since MS rules for 
individual vessel access to quota vary substantially, and use of the 9% inter-species quota flexibility 
(which may totally change relative stability).  Some of the solutions to problems may be specific to 
individual MS or even to individual POs within MS. 
 
Swaps of quota between MS might become more difficult to achieve because MS that previously were 
willing to swap away quota, may now need that quota to prevent the species from becoming a choke 
species for their own vessels, or at least to limit the choke effect of certain species. 
 
The problem and solutions vary by MS according to how they variously manage their allocation of 
quotas to vessels / businesses.  MS and Producer Organisations that operate tradable quota units will 
have different solutions than those that have equal monthly catch allocations per vessel, non-tradable 
and not time flexible.  Different species may choke different individual vessels and / or groups of 
vessels operating in the same sea areas, depending on how access to quota is allocated. 
 
The species that may choke the catching activity depend on MS quota share.   
 
In some cases, it will be difficult to identify in real time what the choke species are going to be, 
because of all the various flexibilities and exemptions that could be exercised.  Equally, it may be 
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difficult to establish more than a few years ahead which species would be likely to choke the activities 
of various groups of vessels. 
 
Some of the choke species issues might be less in future years if or as stock sizes increase and quotas 
increase. 
 
The prospect of going out of business would clearly generate a substantial incentive for individual 
business operators not to comply with the landings obligation and compliance issues should be 
considered in light of identified expected choke species. 
 
Experts are aware of schemes in third countries to manage allocation of quota for choke species and 
suggest that those involved in preparing discard plans may want to familiarise themselves with 
solutions in other parts of the world. 
 
Discards plans will be more likely to be effective if they take consideration of incentives created to be 
more selective in catching and also, the incentives for non-compliance that may be created for 
individual business owners faced with the time and cost of making substantial adjustments to gear and 
practices. 
 
Objective 1 of the CFP requires that fishing should deliver economic and social benefits and be done 
in such a way as to be environmentally sustainable.  Article 15 of CFP reform might prove inconsistent 
with this objective if many vessel businesses cannot continue to trade and much of the agreed quota 
remains uncaught due to the effects of choke species. 
 
Guidelines to MS in preparing Discard Plans: 
Discard plans should include identification of the likely choke species for each MS involved in the 
plan.  It could be useful to use methods similar to those used in Poseidon study and the LEI study.  It 
would also be useful to take account of methods used in Condi et al. 
Having identified choke species per MS, discard plans should show how the problems caused by choke 
species could be alleviated by quota swaps, use of improved selectivity of catching and use of 
exemptions and flexibilities such as the 9% inter-species flexibility and the 5% de minimis legal 
discard. 
Where it is identified that a choke species may cause an early exhaustion of quota, any associated 
compliance risks should be identified in the discards plan and specific risk-based compliance and 
enforcement plans should be prepared. 
Discard plans could consider use of special quota pools for choke species as a possible means to allow 
most vessels to continue fishing while endeavouring to avoid catching the choke species. 
10 CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
 
Definitions of fisheries; management units and timelines for implementation 
 
• Fishery (and “fisheries”) is an ambiguous term this word or concept is used variably to include 
aspects of vessels, vessel types, gear, fishing activity, species or stock and location.  .  
Consideration should be given to what groups or combinations of vessels, species, areas, and 
gears are being managed. Where possible avoid the term “fishery” and define the management 
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units more precisely e.g. fleet segment or vessels, or activity by vessels fishing mainly for 
[species] in [area]. 
 
• Consideration should be given to phasing-in by species rather than fisheries as this negates the 
need to define fisheries (fleet/metier management units) which is problematic particularly in 
complex multi-species/multi-gear fisheries which tend to lack obvious boundaries. 
• Phasing-in based on fisheries will lead to situations where certain species will be either included 
or excluded from the landings obligation depending on the fishery in which they are caught. This 
could in turn present significant control issues and may incentivise switching between 
management units. 
• Clear definition of management units (“fisheries”) will be required for the application of de 
minimis and survival exemptions and other overarching management objectives. Consideration 
should be given to the acceptable level of administrative burden for the definition (aggregation) of 
management units including control and monitoring and the need for clearly defined rules for 
assigning an individual business (vessel) to a particular management unit.   
• Defining fisheries is in essence a difficult task which has no unique and simple scientific solution. 
Individual fishing activities and fishing vessels can be grouped in many ways for defining 
fisheries and fleets, and therefore the question requires a political trade-off on the agreed level of 
aggregation (“zoom in”) and grouping criteria. Defining fisheries based on their target species 
(“fishery for Norway lobster”) is intuitively meaningful, but in practice it is really difficult to 
define clear, robust and objective quantitative rules allowing individual fishing vessels and 
fishing trips to be allocated to such fisheries. Conversely, management units based on gear 
specifications are easier to define, manage and monitor, but they may ignore large differences in 
individual fishing and targeting patterns.     
 
Exemptions on the basis of high survivability  
• Information and data needs that constitute robust scientific evidence of high survival are in 
general substantial and require dedicated scientific experiments which are capable of 
demonstrating survival in the short, medium and long term.  
• Consideration should be given to the current state of the art for specific species/fisheries with 
respect to survival estimates or the potential to obtain such estimates when deciding on species 
and fisheries to be included in discard plans.   
• Consideration should be given to the appropriateness and utility of exemptions based on high 
survival given that this may limit the incentive to improve selectivity thereby undermining one of 
the key principals of the reform. A comparison of the potential impacts of exempting a particular 
species versus an obligation to land should be provided together with supporting justification why 
improvements in selectivity are difficult or unwarranted. 
• Exemptions are likely to be metier specific which has implications in terms of the level of 
supporting information required in that exemptions should not only focus on the biological 
survivability of the species, but how the evidence of survival relates to the fishing activity. As 
such there will be a need to define management units based not only on the species but also on the 
technical characteristics of the vessels, gears and operation. 
• Captive survival experiments are often undertaken under ideal conditions. It is important that any 
studies undertaken as the basis of scientific exemptions replicate as much as practically possible, 
the operational conditions of the fleets for which exemption is being sought. 
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• Where survival is shown to be less than 100%, provisions should be made for estimation of the 
weight and age structure of fish not surviving the discarding process.  
• Approved exemptions should be supported by long term tagging studies to monitor and assess the 
level of true survival in the wild. Such experiments are necessary to eliminate potential (positive) 
bias that may be associated with captive survival studies.   
 
Provisions for de minimis exemptions 
• The basic regulation considers that the application of de minimis discard allocations should be 
considered as a ‘last resort’ after possible technical and tactical adaptations to reduce unwanted 
catch have been exhausted. This may be aided by the use of a hierarchical or decision tree 
analysis.  
• Consideration should be given to reviewing the key “fisheries” in all areas with existing 
discarding issues with the aim of evaluating the potential options currently available to minimise 
discards for each fishery. This should also include the contribution each segment makes to the 
overall catch. 
• By a process of elimination, fleets/metiers where de minimis may be appropriate based on the 
appropriate conditionality, regional groups should provide justification why de minimis is 
required this should include circumstances where it is economically unviable to adjust the 
selectivity of the fleets concerned. This can be achieved by e.g. the application of the break even 
indicator. 
• The EWG interpreted that disproportionate cost is assumed and the issue is how to arrive at some 
discard percentage which will be permitted for a particular gear in a specific fishery. If a different 
understanding of this part of the regulation is assumed then the approach described above for the 
first conditionality could be readily adapted. 
• The process of arriving at an acceptable discard percentage for different gears under an 
assumption of disproportionate cost is complex and depends on the specificities of each fishery. 
• Consideration should be given to the provision of data inter alia describing the fleets that which 
would be recipients of “certain percentage” defined in the regulation, the overall contribution that 
these fleets make to the national and internal catches; causes of disproportionate costs; measures 
already taken to reduce discards.   
 
Provisions for the documentation of catches 
• Discarding and retention takes place at each haul, consideration to requiring haul by haul 
documentation should be considered as this will aid verification of catch.  
• Regional groups will need to establish suitable means of monitoring discarding associated with de 
minimis allowances. The degree of monitoring should be assessed against the potential risks of 
allocations being exceeded. 
• The current >50kg threshold for the mandatory reporting of discards is likely to result in 
significant underreporting of catches and consideration should be given to adjusting the 50kg 
threshold to minimise under reporting of discards.  
• Control tools currently available are focussed towards the control of landings and adherence to 
catch composition rules. These have limited utility for verification of documentation of retained 
and discarded catch and available data shows that there is poor compliance with the mandatory 
recording of discards. Such an analysis could be undertaken considering inter alia current discard 
profiles; fleets known to have ongoing high-grading issues. 
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• In order to ensure a high level of accuracy and compliance, a risk based analysis at a regional 
level which explore the potential for a given fleet not complying with the need to accurately 
record all catches or the retention of all species subject to the landing obligation. 
• Consideration should be given to the continued independent quantification and verification of 
discards by observers and such estimates should be used as the basis of monitoring uptake of 
fishing opportunities. 
 
Fixing of minimum conservation sizes  
• The EWG considers that plans should clearly state the objectives for setting MCRS and that the 
primary objective should be the aim of ensuring the protection of juveniles of marine organisms 
and at the same time maximizing the potential of the resource by changing the exploitation 
pattern. The EWG also considers that plans should also specify the metrics to be used to measure 
protection of juveniles. For example protection of juveniles may be determined through the 
reduction in fishing mortality on juveniles to a specified rate.   
• Regional groups may also consider additional objectives e.g. market; ethical and other 
biological/ecological considerations. In such circumstances it will be necessary to provide 
accompanying justifications. 
• If there is no provision to include a MCRS in the plan for stocks for which a MLS currently 
exists, provision of supporting information to justify the absence of a MCRS would inform the 
decision on whether to accept such a provision. 
• For those stocks that are not currently subject to a MLS, supporting information to justify the 
introduction of a MCRS would inform the decision on whether to accept such a provision and that 
such information should accompany the plan. 
• The EWG considers that plans should provide information to demonstrate that the introduction of 
the proposed MCRS is likely to achieve the stated objectives. Such information, where possible, 
should include results of simulations.   
 
Potential impacts of landing obligation due to choke species 
• The evidence presented suggests that there is a risk of choke species having a large negative 
effect on fishing if access to quota issues cannot be resolved.  In many cases there may be 
businesses unable to continue trading and large quantities of quota uncaught if choke species take 
the effect highlighted. 
• Analyses conducted show how difficult it will be in some cases to allow existing vessels to 
remain in business.  In some cases, substantial changes in practice will be required in order for 
businesses to remain profitable while observing the landings obligations. Without a large margin 
of flexibility (e.g. interpreting the minimis on total TAC or 9% flexibility there could possibly be 
a substantial and unsustainable loss in profitability for vessel businesses. 
• Swaps of quota between MS might become more difficult to achieve because MS that previously 
were willing to swap away quota, may now need that quota to prevent the species from becoming 
a choke species for their own vessels, or at least to limit the choke effect of certain species. 
• The problem and solutions vary by MS according to how they variously manage their allocation 
of quotas to vessels / businesses and their quota allocation of the overall TAC.  MS and Producer 
Organisations that operate tradable quota units will have different solutions than those that have 
equal monthly catch allocations per vessel, non-tradable and not time flexible.  Different species 
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may choke different individual vessels and / or groups of vessels operating in the same sea areas, 
depending on how access to quota is allocated. 
• The prospect of going out of business would clearly generate a substantial incentive for individual 
business operators not to comply with the landings obligation and compliance issues should be 
considered in light of identified expected choke species. 
• Objective 1 of the CFP requires that fishing should deliver economic and social benefits and be 
done in such a way as to be environmentally sustainable.  Article 15 of CFP reform might prove 
inconsistent with this objective if many vessel businesses cannot continue to trade and much of 
the agreed quota remains uncaught due to the effects of choke species. 
• Discard plans should include identification of the likely choke species for each MS involved in 
the plan.  Having identified choke species per MS, discard plans should show how the problems 
caused by choke species could be alleviated by quota swaps, use of improved selectivity of 
catching and use of exemptions and flexibilities such as the 9% inter-species flexibility and the 
5% de minimis legal discard. 
• Where it is identified that a choke species may cause an early exhaustion of quota, any associated 
compliance risks should be identified in the discards plan and specific risk-based compliance and 
enforcement plans should be prepared.Discard plans could consider use of special quota pools for 
choke species as a possible means to allow most vessels to continue fishing while endeavouring 
to avoid catching the choke species. 
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